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There is an endless list of management horror stories, and it is called a list of projects that 
overrun their original cost estimate. There are plenty of examples of overrun projects 
from the wide variety of different industries, and there is no evidence that developments 
in project simulation models or utilisation of data are going to solve the fundamental 
difficulty of cost estimation in the near future. In fact, there seems to be a significant gap 
between the complex algorithms and estimation methods that currently exist in the liter-
ature and methods that the companies actually use for cost estimation.  
The objective of this thesis is therefore to advance knowledge about communicating and 
sense making of uncertainty in the project cost estimation phase. This is done by explor-
ing implications and changes that the implementation of uncertainty estimation practises 
causes in the case company of this thesis. Uncertainty estimation for project front-end, in 
the sales phase, was something new for the case company. The implementation was there-
fore very rare opportunity to witness a situation where organization has realized that they 
are unable to correctly manage and estimate the uncertainty that is present in their project 
environment.  
Findings of this thesis suggest that it is beneficiary to include multiple organizational 
functions into the estimation process and translate their analyses and feelings about un-
certainty into boundary object, through which uncertainty can be communicated. In this 
thesis boundary object was cost contingency, which concretized for the organization that 
uncertainty has inevitable cost implications for the project. Through this communication 
organization can form organizational view on uncertainty of the project, instead of all the 
different organizational units trying to analyze and manage the uncertainty separately.   
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PREFACE 
Deep down in my hearth, I am humanist who just happened to study engineering. This 
meant that, when presented with the opportunity to improve project cost management of 
my case company, I was not only interested about the technical side of the cost estimation. 
I wanted to understand what happens in the organization and in the minds of people when 
they estimate uncertainty. Main learning for me from this process is that humans are very 
bad at understanding and estimating something as vague as “uncertainty”, and therefore 
its management requires both communication and better data.   
Research process began in September 2017 and was finalized in April 2018. I am thankful 
for the case company and my supervisor there to be able to concentrate on this thesis and 
the intervention I executed for the case company. Without my supervisor in the case com-
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In addition to the case company, I want to thank Dr. Jouni Lyly-Yrjänäinen for his feed-
back and guidance; both his courses and the feedback I received for this thesis have been 
eye-openers on how hard it is to produce knowledge and to keep your writing logical and 
consistent. This thesis is nowhere near perfection, but everyone has to start somewhere, 
and I will surely return to the teachings of this thesis whenever I’m starting complicated 
writing tasks in the future. Last but not least, I would like to thank all the friends and 
loved ones I have met during my studies, for this would have been a boring journey with-
out you.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Large projects are often characterized by significant cost and time overruns (Shane et al. 
2009, Giezen 2012, Merrow et al. 1981). Historically especially construction projects and 
transportation infrastructure projects have been plagued by cost escalations (Shane et al. 
2009); for example Flyvbjerg (2014) estimates that 9 out of 10 transportation infrastruc-
ture projects exceeded their initial cost estimate, and in another study Lee (2008) found 
out that out of 138 evaluated road projects 95% had exceeded their budget. However, 
examples are easy enough to find almost in any other industry as well, such as IT (Brooks 
1995) or energy industry (Engwall 2003). The worst of these cost escalations also make 
it to the newspapers and media regularly since these projects are often funded by the 
public money and hence also gather interest of taxpayers.   
Even though big part of the literature on cost overruns focuses on the major projects, it is 
not the sheer size of these projects that causes overruns and cost escalations, but rather 
the complexity and uniqueness of the projects (Merrow et al. 1981). Perceived reasons 
for cost overruns vary from poor project management to poor communication between 
stakeholders (Jackson 2002), but one recurring theme related to the project overruns 
seems to be high degree of uncertainty in the planning phase – which then later in the 
project results in budget difficulties.  
In this sense, the overruns are often failures of uncertainty management and inability to 
respond to uncertainty in the project environment. Some uncertainties can be predicted 
and therefore mitigated at the beginning of the project, while others are difficult or im-
possible to foresee and therefore create uncertainty into the project implementation phase 
(Atkinson et al. 2006). Traditional project literature emphasizes the control procedures as 
means to mitigate the risks, but this approach is often criticized by its inefficiency into 
responding uncertainty (Atkinson et al. 2006). This thesis acknowledges the same fact, 
and instead of trying to perfectly model the project environment and its every detail, the 
goal is to increase the understanding project stakeholders have about the project uncer-
tainties, so necessary actions can be taken to manage uncertainty.  
This thesis was conducted for the case company between September 2017 and April 2018. 
Case company has a long history of delivering projects, but the size and complexity of 
them was increasing significantly. Projects of the case company are typically delivered to 
different countries and to completely different types of project environments for example 
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in the terms of culture, customer know-how and legislation, making reliance completely 
on historical data difficult. Furthermore, often the case company is also responsible for 
the overall execution of the project, as the projects are sold as turn-key deliveries for the 
customer, meaning that the responsibility of uncertainty management was completely 
case company’s responsibility as a turn-key supplier. 
This thesis is a case research on how uncertainty estimation practices and the culture of 
analyzing uncertainty can be adopted into a company that has not experiences over them. 
Furthermore, how different stakeholders in the company make sense of uncertainty for 
cost estimation practices was also a key interest in this research. Useful concept in this 
was treating uncertainty analysis as a boundary object through which different organiza-
tional functions, especially sales and project management, can communicate about their 
views and understanding about uncertainty. 
1.2 Objectives and Scope 
Söderlund (2011) advices that future research in the field of project management should 
embrace the pluralism of project management research and use multi-perspective ap-
proach to further advance the field. More precisely, Söderlund and Maylor (2012) found 
that there is a research gap between the “hard and soft sides” of project management. 
However, in real life project managers must deal with both hard side and soft sides of 
project management simultaneously (Koppenjan et al. 2011). Therefore, this thesis aims 
to mix these hard and soft sides of project management by both researching implementa-
tion of control and analysis methods for uncertainty and the communication and under-
standing that arises from the usage of those methods.   
Akintoye (2000) commented in conclusions of his study that the future research on project 
cost estimation should focus further on the cognitive aspects of estimation practices, ra-
ther than just taking a look into estimation principles. Agreeing with this, Williams and 
Samset (2010) discussed about how the psychology and biases affect the cost estimation 
practices. They recognized a precise research gap: 
“There is a need for further research into how different organizational forms and 
cultures with different project complexities and domains operate in all of these 
stages and the correlations between them.” 
In a similar manner, Turkulainen et al. (2013) addressed the need to further research or-
ganizational integration mechanisms: 
“Very interesting, yet empirically rather challenging, would be to assess the use 
of integration mechanisms in project-based firms and their global projects from 
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an institutional perspective…one way to empirically address the institutional per-
spective would be by closely observing the actual decision making processes in the 
firms.” 
When looking more closely the literature on uncertainty management, there is a research 
gap between different types of uncertainty and practical ways to manage them. For ex-
ample, Saunders et al. (2015) conclude in their article on uncertainty that there is a re-
search gap between linking different determinants of uncertainty to the different ap-
proaches to manage them. In similar manner, Sauser et al. (2009) found out that in project 
management literature there is a need to find out what kind of methods fit into what situ-
ations.  
This thesis follows these authors’ call for research and builds its research on the case 
study of practically implementing uncertainty management practices. This offers inter-
esting research approach through which it can be demonstrated how the uncertainty anal-
ysis can practically support the decision making and communication between different 
organizational cultures and different departments of the organization, compared to the 
situation where the uncertainty has not yet been conceptualized in the active usage at the 
case company.  
There are not many previous case studies done from the implementation of uncertainty 
management practices. For example, the seven schools of project management Söderlund 
(2011) recognizes are mainly interested about different methods of managing project and 
their uncertainty and none of them is mainly focused on implementing new project man-
agement methods. There is a wide branch of literature in implementing for example ac-
tivity based costing models (see for example Anderson 1995) and lean models (Pheng & 
Teo 2004, Kumar et al. 2006), but these do not necessarily concern the project manage-
ment or project uncertainty management literature. Furthermore, in many studies where 
the risk management or uncertainty management practices are implemented (Conrow & 
Shishido 1997, Rice et al. 2008), the main focus still remains on details of the tools itself 
instead of their impacts on daily practices, communication, culture and generally soft side 
of project management.  
This lack of case studies where the uncertainty management practices are implemented 
means that the case study conducted for the case company is interesting as such, as liter-
ature scarce about the organizational implications of different uncertainty management 
models. This also offers a good chance to combine different schools of project manage-
ment and therefore embrace pluralism as Söderlund (2011) recommends. Last but not 
least, this thesis offers more insight into the important organizational boundary between 
project and sales functions.  
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The objective of this thesis can now be stated as… 
…... to investigate, how organizations estimate, make sense and communicate un-
certainty and its costs in the project sales phase. 
In more detail this objective is reached with the help of three supportive objectives. Firstly 
(1), this thesis aims to find out on concrete level, what kind of tools are used to estimate 
uncertainty in Finnish project-based industries. Secondly (2), in this thesis the interven-
tion for the case company’s uncertainty estimation practices is made, and those impacts 
for the company that does not have previous experience about estimating uncertainty are 
observed. Finally (3), by comparing the literature and observations from the case study, 
we evaluate how uncertainty estimation tools can enhance understanding and communi-
cation about project uncertainty in the project sales phase. 
Aim to find out what tools are in use in Finnish project-based industries is rooted to the 
traditional project management practice where the focus is in the usage of tools and quan-
titative modelling of projects. Söderlund (2011) defines this as optimization school of 
project management. However, this objective also links the research into ongoing practice 
in the uncertainty management; rather than analyzing advanced concepts for uncertainty 
analyses that can be found from the literature, this thesis focuses specifically on the ex-
isting practices.  
However, rest of the study is more rooted to the behaviorist schools of project manage-
ment, in which the focus is in organizational processes, knowledge management and com-
munication (Söderlund 2011).  The goal is to observe the changes on the behavior and 
practices in the case company to understand what effects the concept of uncertainty causes 
in the behavior of project and sales management and what kind of communication the 
uncertainty analysis enables.  
Finally, the whole topic of the thesis is closely related to the decision school of project 
management, which is interested about the decision making of the projects which lead to 
project’s approval or cancellation (Söderlund 2011). This is due the fact that uncertainty 
analyses are used for supporting decision making processes in the project front-end (Gar-
vey et al. 2016); for example, in the ideal situation the projects in which risks and cost 
are unacceptable should be cancelled before they even progress to the implementation 
phase.   
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
There are nine chapters in this thesis. Chapter 2 aims to portray a process of the thesis 
work and presents research’s methodology choices. This chapter also takes a deeper look 
into explaining interventionist approach used in this thesis and the usage of semi-struc-
tured interviews in this research.  
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Chapters 3 contains literature review to the field of uncertainty management, looking into 
how literature currently defines uncertainty, what different schools of thoughts there is 
regarding uncertainty management and finally presenting, how different individuals and 
organizations have different perceptions on uncertainty.  
Chapter 4 takes a literature review on the practical side of this thesis, which is project cost 
estimation. After this, chapter presents current practices found in the literature which can 
be used to analyze uncertainty in a project cost estimation phase.  
Chapter 5 contains pivotal concept for this thesis, boundary objects, and uncertainty anal-
yses are in this chapter analyzed as boundary objects through which different organiza-
tional functions can communicate their perception of uncertainty. 
Chapter 6 presents the case company, business processes relevant to the thesis topic and 
current situation that the company faces. After this, analysis of the current understanding 
and the management of uncertainty in the case company is presented based on the re-
searcher’s interactions and observations in the case company during the beginning part 
of the intervention. 
Chapter 7 presents the interventions done in the case company. At the beginning of the 
chapter findings from the external interviews are presented, drawing picture about prac-
tices in use in different industries regarding uncertainty estimation and management in 
the cost estimation phase.  
Chapter 8 continues this theme by analyzing intervention’s effects at the case company, 
how the processes and communication in the case company changed and analyzes what 
this means from the perspective of this thesis framework.  
Finally, chapter 9 evaluates how the goal of the thesis was reached, assesses the implica-
tions on research and managerial practice and analyzes the limitations of this study.  
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2. RESEARCH PROCESS AND STRATEGY 
2.1 Research process 
Research process started with recognizing the broad problem of cost overruns with the 
case company at the beginning of September 2017.  Case company had recognized that 
they were not meeting the designed project budgets, and from the case company’s per-
spective the aim was to find proposals and concrete solutions how the profitability of the 
projects could be improved. This meant that it was beneficial for the researcher to use 
interventions as data gathering methods, as some kind of change or improvement in the 
project delivery process was what the case company desired.  
There had been significant amount of “lessons learnt” type of exercises in the case com-
pany in the past, and the mistakes and failures that occurred in the past projects were well 
known. It was clear that there was little to be learned from benchmarking the past prac-
tices. Project cost estimation practices at the case company were really straightforward 
and deterministic, and based on an assumption that everything will go according to the 
original estimate. Lack of uncertainty estimation in the case company lead to the risk that 
projects were sold with wrong margins, and that case company started projects with un-
realistic cost estimates. This made educated decisions regarding uncertainty and desired 
sales price difficult in the case company.  
Therefore, the main focus of this thesis soon switched on to how the uncertainty estima-
tion practices can be introduced to the case company’s processes. For the research this 
offered an interesting outlook on about what cultural changes this enabled and what kind 
of communication emerged in the case company when the uncertainty was defined and 
analyzed. Approach in this thesis was to seek good practices for project cost estimation 
process, introduce them in the case company and then observe as a researcher the changes 
and effects these concepts had in the case company.  
Project started by interviewing internally case company’s management, project managers, 
sales managers, and other persons related to the case company’s project sales and delivery 
process. The goal was to better scope the project and recognize potential for improve-
ments in the process that could be meaningfully implemented by the researcher.  
Literature review was conducted from the very beginning to establish background and 
framework against which findings could be evaluated. Literature review was necessary 
from two viewpoints. Firstly, to recognize what the literature says about the best practices 
of controlling project costs, so that the intervention could be planned. Secondly, as in any 
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research, literature review was necessary for recognizing the gaps in the project cost man-
agement literature, so that the findings could be looked in a way that this thesis advances 
the existing project cost management literature.  
During this beginning phase of the thesis work the cost estimation process was recognized 
as having most potential for the improvement, as the current cost estimation practices did 
not seem to take account the uncertainty in a systematic way. Furthermore, the views and 
tools among project function and sales function about uncertainty in their estimates varied 
a lot, which then seemed to offer interesting topic for the thesis, as there was not previous 
research in which the project cost estimation tools would have been analyzed as boundary 
objects.  
Intervention itself consisted of two parts: interviews and implementation of the uncer-
tainty estimation tool. Goal of the interviews was to benchmark best practices and tools 
in use in the five Finnish project-based companies for the case company. Case company 
could have done this themselves had they decided to do so, and the questions asked in 
benchmarked companies were not particularly scientific: researcher provided here raw 
manpower and time to go in the field and ask about the estimation practices. Second part 
of the intervention was then to implement a tool for estimating the effect of uncertainty 
on the project cost estimates, based on the information found from the project manage-
ment literature and from the benchmarked external companies. This tool was also imple-
mented to the case company’s processes and trained for project managers and sales man-
agers. These training sessions then provided invaluable feedback and allowed the re-
searcher to see in practice the effect of the implemented tools on ongoing projects.  
Finally, the findings from these activities were analyzed against the existing literature and 
the objective of this thesis. Timeline of these activities is presented in Table 1.     
Table 1. Research process. 
 
As quite often happens when using intervention as a data-gathering method, the overall 
process for intervention from this initial starting point proved to be very iterative in nature 
(Saunders et al. 2011). In the process for crafting the intervention, four iterative loops of 
diagnosis, planning of the activities, action and result evaluation can be recognized. These 
are presented in Figure 1.  
Activities
September October November December January February March
Gathering understanding on case 
company's cost estimation process
Literature review
Building framework
External interviews
Building tool for uncertainty estimation
Implementing uncertainty estimation 
practises in the case company
Writing lesson's learnt
2017 2018
Chapter 6
Chapters 3-5
Chapter 7.1
Chapter 7.2 - 7.5
Chapter 7.2,
Chapter 8
Chapter 5.2
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Figure 1.  Iterative nature of the intervention. 
Interviews at the case company were the first loop, which led to conclusion that there is 
a need to focus on cost estimation phase and that it is necessary to find options for the 
actual uncertainty estimation. Second loop were the external interviews, which led to the 
list of options and gave practical feedback about different uncertainty estimation methods. 
Third loop was testing the methods at the case company in order to select the most suitable 
uncertainty estimation method. Finally, the method was implemented, which provided 
more feedback and knowledge about the practical usage of the implemented method.  
Implementation in itself was already interesting, as the examples from implementing un-
certainty analysis tools for project business are rare. Furthermore, the findings from these 
activities were analyzed against the framework constructed with the literature review and 
recognized research gaps. Framework aimed to explain how the understanding of the un-
certainties in the project environment can be communicated across organizational func-
tions with the help of boundary object. Used framework will be presented at the end of 
the literature review in chapter 5.  
2.2 Research philosophy and methodology choices 
Purpose of this research is exploratory. It aims to set new insights into how organizational 
boundaries affect the uncertainty estimation practices and to the understanding over un-
certainty. At the same time, this thesis aims see different ways in which uncertainty anal-
ysis is linked to the organizational communication. This purpose of the research affected 
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the methodology choices of this thesis, which are summarized in Figure 2 by adapting the 
“research onion” as presented by Saunders et al. (2011). 
 
Figure 2. Research choices of this thesis (adapted from Saunders et al. 2011). 
Research philosophy is a broad concept encompassing the development and the nature of 
knowledge (Saunders et al. 2011). Research philosophy adopted in this thesis is pragma-
tism, which can be described as approach in where the reality is interpreted in the way 
which best supports and enables answering to the research question (Saunders et al. 2011). 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) describe characteristic view of pragmatism as 
“knowledge is both constructed and based on the reality of the world we experience and 
live in”. This describes well the situation and the topic of this thesis: while uncertainties 
and project risks are real life events, they are also interpreted, managed and even caused 
by psychological and organizational factors.  
Cost estimation is sometimes seen as very positivist process by its practioners, in which 
the researcher aims to keep the research free of value and analyze the reality in determin-
istic way. In this kind of approach the focus is in quantifiable observations and the as-
sumption is that they reveal true knowledge about reality (Saunders et al. 2011). On the 
other hand, when dealing with unknowns of the estimation more interpretivist approach 
is required and it is necessary to understand the subjective nature of human and organi-
zational interactions. Therefore, in the context of this thesis it was necessary to look both 
objectively at the available data and the meanings attached to it by individuals.  
Saunders et al. (2011) define induction and deduction as two main research approaches. 
Deduction can be understood as the search of causal relationships between variables: re-
search aims to test the theory in practice. Induction takes the opposite approach: data is 
first collected and then analyzed. (Saunders et al. 2011) Research approach in this thesis 
was abduction, which can be understood as combination between inductive and deductive 
approaches (Dubois & Gadde 2002). Abduction is a typical approach in interventionist 
studies because the intervention often requires the balancing between emic and etic levels 
of research: emic meaning the study of human behavior as a part of the system, and etic 
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outside it (Suomala et al. 2014). Emic viewpoint therefore often requires inductive ap-
proach, whereas on the etic level deductive approach is often used.  
Research strategy in this thesis can be best described as interventionist research. Inter-
ventionism as used in this thesis is synonym with what Saunders et al. (2011) define as 
action research. In this thesis term “interventionist research” is preferred over “action 
research”. Saunders et al. (2011) note the lack of clear definition of interventionist re-
search, noting that there are several elements associated with the term in the literature. 
These elements are 
1. Goal of causing change the case organization 
2. Active participation of researcher into the case organization’s activities 
3. Iterative nature of research 
4. Implications beyond imminent research project 
First and second points are what according to Suomala et al. (2014) separates interven-
tionist research from the empirical case studies; although in the empirical case studies 
interviews and observations are often the main data gathering methods, in interventionist 
research the researcher is “a facilitator of change”. Interventionist research is therefore 
typically concerned about solving problems or issues in the target organization and aims 
for the change in the environment. Furthermore, interventionist research includes the in-
volvement of researcher in the organization where the problem-solving takes place.  
Thirdly, as Saunders et al. (2011) note, interventionist research is iterative process, during 
which diagnose, planning, action taking and evaluation happens in multiple cycles. This 
is because in most cases the researcher does not know what data the intervention will 
reveal or the findings that can be derived from the data. In this sense interventionist re-
searcher is a detective who analyses the facts revealed by the subsequent cycles of action 
taking and diagnosing, with the exception that the interventionist research might not al-
ways know what they are looking for. 
Finally, the interventionist research should have implications beyond the research project 
and ideally advance and develop theories and knowledge (Saunders et al. 2011). As Su-
omala, et al. (2014)  note, one of the dangers of interventionist research is the unpredict-
ability of obtaining academically interesting results. As the researcher ventures in the case 
company, they do not know before the intervention what findings they will make and 
whether they will uncover anything interesting. From this point of view interventionist 
research is a bit like gambling; there is a possibility of gaining unique access to the case 
company and uncovering truly interesting phenomenon that would not have been encoun-
tered through questionnaires or interviews, but at the same time there’s a risk that this 
access does not reveal anything academically interesting.  
Multi-method means research which applies multiple techniques to the collection of data 
and analysis but in which the methods are either from qualitative or quantitative domain 
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(Saunders et al. 2011). Despite from acknowledging both positivist and interpretivist re-
search philosophies through the lenses of pragmatism, this thesis uses mainly qualitative 
techniques and can therefore be described as qualitative multi-method study. Quantitative 
methods were used during the intervention to affect cost estimation process of the case 
company, but this was not data gathering for the research purposes.  
2.3 Data-gathering methods 
Gummesson (1993) listed data-gathering methods of the qualitative research to be as fol-
lows: 1) Using existing material, 2) Questionnaires and surveys, 3) Interviews, 4) Obser-
vation and 5) Action research. Table 2 summarizes how these different methods were 
used in the course of the research.  
Table 2. Data sources of the research and their purpose in the data gathering. 
Category Form of usage 
in this thesis 
Purpose 
Use of existing 
material 
Literature review 
 
 
-Familiarization with existing theories 
-Positioning the study 
-Ideas from the ways in which company’s processes 
could be improved 
Project reports -Familiarization with the problems of the case com-
pany’s projects 
-Researching cost overruns and their causes at the 
case company 
Interviews External semi-
structured inter-
views 
-Mapping best practices 
-Positioning the research questions to the wider 
context 
Internal semi-
structured inter-
views 
-Understanding the uncertainty in the activities of 
the case company 
Observation Observation in 
the company 
-Understanding the context and the culture in the 
case company 
Action research Intervention -Understanding the process of current cost estima-
tion and uncertainty management practices 
-Observation of changes in the company and its 
practical limitations 
 
Use of multiple data sources and methods increases triangulation of the study and there-
fore the reliability of the study (Barratt et al. 2011). Despite the usage of most of the data 
gathering methods Gummesson (1993) mentions, main data gathering method was inter-
vention and semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews allowed to under-
stand the current practices at the case company and to research the cost estimation prac-
tices in other industries. After this, the intervention provided access to first-hand infor-
mation by disturbing the communication and the cost estimation practice at the case com-
pany, and allowed to focus on answering the main research questions.  
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According to Saunders et al. (2011), in a semi-structured interview researcher has a list 
of themes and questions prepared for the interview, but they may be developed and mod-
ified for each interview according to the context and the progress of the interview. Semi-
structured interview offers for the interviewees and interviewer greater degree of freedom 
to where to direct the conversation (Saunders et al. 2011), and hence the opportunity to 
open discussion about issues neither has considered before. 
The use of probes is typical for the semi-structured interviews. Probes, also known as 
follow-ups, are way to stimulate the interview and to get additional information during 
the course of the interview. Typical situations are when the interviewer does not under-
stand everything the interviewee has said, or believes that the respondent could be able 
to answer in more detail and depth. (Harrell & Bradley 2009) Probes are therefore used 
to clarify what interviewee has said or for increasing the completeness of interviewees 
accounts. According to Saunders et al. (2011) the use of probes is typical when adopting 
interpretivist approach and trying to understand the meanings interviewees attach to their 
answers. Finally, probing may lead the researcher into the discussion that includes a view-
point not originally considered while planning the research but which is important for the 
overall understanding of the research subject (Saunders et al. 2011). Probing can also 
cause biases into the research, for example in situations where interviewee says things 
that are not true because they lack knowledge or they just want to satisfy the researcher 
(Harrell & Bradley 2009).  
Saunders et al. (2011) list some situations where the usage of semi-structured interviews 
can be advantageous. Usage of semi-structured interviews is typical or the explanatory 
and exploratory studies when the rich data over causal relationships or new phenomena 
is needed. Interviews are also used a lot when there is a need to establish a personal con-
tact with the interviewee, either in order to gain access to them or to get them confident 
in revealing the details about their practices. Furthermore, semi-structured interviews are 
suitable for situations where the questions are large or open-ended. Finally, semi-struc-
tured interviews allow the interviewees to control the time they spend for the interviews. 
The reasoning to use semi-structured interviews in this thesis is presented in Table 3.  
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Table 3. Reasoning for using semi-structured interviews. 
Reason to use semi-structured inter-
view 
Reasoning in the context of this study 
Purpose of the research This study was exploratory and explanatory 
Significance of personal contact The study involved gaining access to information about 
company processes; it was necessary to sell the idea 
of interview to the interviewees 
Nature of questions Course of interview was hard to predict due to high var-
iance in the uncertainty management practices in differ-
ent companies 
Length of time required Interview was more suitable for participants than the 
questionnaire, since then the interviewees had more 
control over time spend on the interview 
 
Gummesson (1993) sees interventionist research as data gathering method in itself which 
can then involve other data gathering methods. Intervention as a research method allowed 
access to the host organization. While data from the uncertainty management tools could 
have been obtained from the literature, the data about their practical usages and organi-
zational issues could not have been obtained by simply interviewing the host organiza-
tion. Most notably, the host organization would not have adopted uncertainty manage-
ment practices without participation of the researcher, and therefore this disruption in the 
case company could not have been analyzed.   
Intervention as a research method allowed to immediately test the ideas “on the field” 
(Suomala et al. 2014) and to get data from the practical impacts of the uncertainty esti-
mation practices. This allowed movement between the academic ideas and the practical 
project management (Jönsson & Lukka 2005). This was very suitable for the research 
gaps at hand since many of these arose from the literature’s notion that there is a gap 
between understanding the practical side of uncertainty estimation and the theory of un-
certainty. However, this active participation posed also challenges for the research, as it 
was possible, like mentioned by Suomala and Lyly-Yrjänäinen (2012) to create idiosyn-
cratic results that would not have been encountered otherwise. 
During this thesis the role of the researcher towards the company was more or less a 
consultant whose aim was to improve profitability of case company’s projects by improv-
ing the way uncertainties are calculated in the sales phase. This enabled close participa-
tion in the case company’s cost estimation processes as well as access to all the data 
related to it. Drawback was that not all the work that was done directly contributed to this 
thesis as several work phases and analysis made were only interesting from the case com-
pany’s viewpoint. However, it can be argued that this in turn increased the researchers 
understanding on case company’s activities, and trying to eliminate all of this excess work 
would have been counterproductive for the results of this thesis, as it would have de-
creased both the value to the case company and the understanding of the researcher of the 
project uncertainties.  
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3. PROJECT UNCERTAINTY 
3.1 Uncertainty 
PMI (2008) defines the project risk as “an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, 
has a positive or negative effect on a project's objectives”. Even though this definition 
includes both positive and negative consequences, the word “risk” has inherently negative 
connotation in it. Given the fact that many projects are struggling with cost overruns 
(Flyvbjerg et al. 2014), it is not much of a surprise that traditionally the negative side of 
effects has been emphasized and much of the attention has been on mitigating the negative 
effects and less about managing positive opportunities (Ward & Chapman 2003).   
In mathematical terms the “risk” is often broken down into the multiplication of proba-
bility and impact (Williams 1996). While defining and managing risks this way surely 
helps to evaluate the severity of risks, it draws very deterministic picture on the nature of 
risk and contains the idea that the risk is something that can accurately be quantified be-
fore the project. While this might be possible regarding simple projects or in situations 
where there is plenty of accurate historical data available, often in reality it is impossible 
to measure all the risks or even try to acquire and process all the information related to 
the complexities of the project. Project managers and humans in general make assump-
tions based on previous experience and knowledge, and while this is relevant in regular 
situations, in unique situations this means that future cannot be predicted accurately 
(Taleb 2007). Following example of Ward and Chapman (2003), in this thesis the term 
“uncertainty” is preferred over the term “risk” to emphasize on the one hand the unpre-
dictable nature of reality and on the one hand the possible non-predictable positive events 
that might happen as well.  
Van der Hejden (2011) recognizes 3 categories for uncertainty: Risks, structural uncer-
tainties and unknowables. Similarly, De Meyer et al. (2002) categorize uncertainty into 
four categories: variation, foreseen uncertainty, unforeseen uncertainty and chaos. In this 
thesis taxonomy of De Meyer et al. (2002) is preferred due convenient and descriptive 
naming, but the fourth category, chaos, is left out. This is due the fact the fourth category 
of De Meyer et al. (2002), chaos, refers to projects where even the outcome is completely 
uncertain, in an extent for such projects the outcome might be completely different from 
the project’s original intent. This might happen for example when a software developed 
as a game turns out to have practical appliances. Whereas chaos is useful concept for 
example in the software development, the concrete nature of the projects under observa-
tion in this thesis did not allow projects where chaos was encountered.  
Variation refers to minor adjustments in the values of pre-known activities of which or-
ganization possesses enough historical pretext for example in the form of similar events, 
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so probabilities for various outcomes can be reasonably estimated. Structural uncertain-
ties are events, which can be predicted through cause and effect chain of reasoning, but 
organization have no means of assessing how likely it would be. Unknowables, “Un-
known unknowns” or “out-of-the-blue” are the events which organization can not even 
imagine in the planning phase and there has no clue what they even might be. They might 
rise from unknown project environments or simply from the unanticipated interaction of 
previously known structural uncertainties (De Meyer et al. 2002).  
Another way of categorizing project uncertainty is to evaluate elements that are under 
uncertainty. Huchzermeier (2001) recognizes the following five elements of variability: 
1. Market payoff variability, referring to the uncertainty in received payments 
2. Budget variability, referring to the uncertainty in cost evaluation  
3. Performance variability, referring to the uncertainty in performance of project ex-
ecution 
4. Requirement variability, referring to the uncertainty of customer’s requirements 
5. Schedule variability, referring to the uncertainty in schedule 
These elements of variability refer to the operational uncertainties in the project and de-
scribe the possible elements in the project that might be affected by uncertainty. While 
from the cost estimation point of view the variation of budget is the most interesting from 
these, are these elements nevertheless are linked; underperformance for example could 
cause schedule overruns and that in turn might cause budget overruns. Huchzermeier’s 
list is not exhaustive, and other elements could be added as well, for example customer 
satisfaction or the benefits to the organization (Atkinson 1999) or performance against 
original design criteria (Hopfe & Hensen 2011).  
3.2 Uncertainty as a cause for cost overrun 
Uncertainty is often understood as the lack of information (Johansen et al. 2014). Accord-
ing to Saunders et al. (2015), there are five categories in the literature for causes of un-
certainty:  
1. Environmental uncertainties 
2. Individual uncertainties 
3. Complexity 
4. Information uncertainty 
5. Temporal uncertainty 
Environmental uncertainties are caused by the project external factors, such as changes 
in project environment and project external factors. In contrast, individual factors refer to 
the different motivational, cognitive and psychological factors that create uncertainty to 
both the estimates and execution of the projects. Complexity of the project is often cited 
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reason for uncertainty, and for example Baccarini (1996) defines complexity as the prod-
uct of differentiation and interdependence, differentiation referring to number of elements 
under variation and interdependence to the degree to which these elements are dependent 
on each other. Information factors refer to the uncertainty caused by the lack of infor-
mation, either created from the impossibility to estimate causalities during the project 
execution or from the organizational estimation capabilities. Temporal factors are those 
sources of uncertainty that tend to change during the course of the project, for example 
uncertainty in certain time-critical phases of the projects.  
Causes different authors have found for project overruns have striking similarities with 
the causes for uncertainty; it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the two from the litera-
ture.  From this point of view the differences between the two seem often semantical. This 
is of course understandable; if there would not be any uncertainty associated with the 
project, there should also not be a possibility for cost overruns. If the cause for project 
overrun is not related to the project environment, it is often then related to the internal 
uncertainties created by organizational challenges. For example, both “lack of infor-
mation” or “limited estimation ability” as a cause for project uncertainty from Saunders 
et al. (2015), can be linked either to the uncertainty in project environment or to the or-
ganizational inabilities that create uncertainty.  
Shane et al (2009) divided the cost escalation causes into the project internal and external 
factors. Some overruns are due to internal factors of the project, like the inadequate co-
operation between tender and contractors, and some due external factors, like changes in 
the country’s legislation. Some causes for overruns can be a combination of both internal 
and external factors, for example when the organization fail to estimate external environ-
ment. Figure 3 below presents both causes for cost overruns and uncertainties analyzing 
whether they are internal or external causes; position in between means that it can be both.  
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Figure 3. Fundamental project uncertainties and causes for project overruns 
(adapted after Saunders et al. 2015, Shane et al. 2009). 
When looking at the list of internal factors causing uncertainty, it is easy to see how many 
of them are linked to different organizational and psychological factors either on the in-
dividual, organizational or stakeholder level. Even with the case of environmental uncer-
tainties, many of the factors can also be seen from the point of view that the project or-
ganization was unable to analyze the environment of the project. This is the view De 
Meyer et al. (2002) adopt; it is not the uncertainties in the project characteristics or in the 
environment that cause project overruns, it is the failure to manage uncertainty that is the 
source of cost overruns.  
Several studies which try to rank the causes for cost overruns have been conducted in the 
past. For example, Cheng (2014) cites the unclear scope definition, cost control and con-
tractual matters as cost factors having most influence on cost overruns. On the contrary 
Le-Hoai, Dai Lee and Young Lee (2008) cite poor project management and project parties 
financial difficulties as the main reasons for project overruns. From the field of software 
development the insufficient and unrealistic project planning and project scope changes 
were among main causes for overruns (Van Genuchten 1991).  Problem for these studies 
is that they are highly specific to the projects studied, and it is hard to generalize these 
findings for different types of projects or for different cultural regions. On the other hand, 
this demonstrates the fact that there is no simple single explanation for all the project cost 
overruns – projects by definition are unique and so are their overruns.  
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3.3 Uncertainty management literature 
Uncertainty management literature can be linked to the seven schools of project manage-
ment research recognized by Söderlund (2011). Söderlund (2011) categorized in his arti-
cle the different views on project management and the base traditions of literature for 
which these schools of thought are based on. While Söderlund’s review was generally 
about the project management literature, the same schools of thought can be used to cat-
egorize project uncertainty management literature. How the articles in this literature re-
view are linked to Söderlund’s schools of project management literature is presented in 
Table 4.  
Table 4. Seven schools of project management and their link to uncertainty manage-
ment (adapted from Söderlund 2011). 
School Examples articles from 
project uncertainty 
management perspec-
tive 
 Uncertainty 
management 
methods 
Base traditions 
Optimization 
school 
Northcraft and Wolf 
(1984),  Acebes et al. 
(2013) 
 Planning of 
the complex 
tasks, quanti-
tative model-
ling methods  
Management sci-
ence 
Factor 
school 
Alter and Ginzberg 
(1978), Clark (1989), At-
kinson (1999), Tatikonda 
and Rosenthal (2000)  
 Project suc-
cess and fail-
ure determi-
nants 
Diverse 
Contingency 
school 
Pich et al. (2002), De 
Meyer et al. (2002), 
Sauser et al. (2009) 
 Project organi-
zation’s de-
sign, contin-
gencies, flexi-
bility, coordi-
nation 
Sociology, organ-
izational theory 
Behavior 
school 
Engwall (2003), Grabher 
(2004) 
 Organizational 
processes, 
Learning, 
communica-
tion, creativ-
ity, culture,  
Organizational 
behaviour, 
psychology 
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Governance 
school 
Eccles (1981), Osipova 
and Eriksson (2012) 
 Governance of 
project organi-
zations and 
stakeholders 
Economics 
Relationship 
school 
Hellgren and Stjernberg 
(1995), Cova and 
Hoskins (1997), Vaaland, 
Håkansson (2003), Aal-
tonen et al. (2010) 
 Project net-
work and   
stakeholder 
management 
Industrial market-
ing 
Decission 
school 
Matta and Ashkenas 
(2003), Lovallo and 
Kahneman (2003), 
Cooper and Budd (2006), 
Williams and Samset 
(2010) 
 The interplay 
among deci-
sion makers 
Political science  
 
Firstly, optimization school is what is understood as traditionally management science: 
for example, gantt charts, budgets, scheduling and work breakdown structures. This 
school search for methods which help managers to optimize projects management with 
the help of mathematics and management science (Söderlund & Maylor 2012). In the 
field of uncertainty management this school can be recognized as the branch of literature 
aiming to optimize and model the uncertainty, and therefore deal with the uncertainty 
management by quantitative and deterministic methods (Saunders et al. 2015).  
Optimization approach has been often criticized to be too deterministic by its nature (Ace-
bes et al. 2014) and while they often include views on managing variability they often 
lack tools to manage unknowns. As a consequence, theories of optimization school often 
don’t have clear picture about uncertainty management (Perminova et al. 2008). Authors 
in the optimization school have in the recent literature also themselves realized how their 
approach is limited by the amount of relevant and correct information and relatively sta-
bility of project environment (Jackson 2002, Söderlund 2011).  
Secondly, factor school investigates the criteria for the project overruns and the charac-
teristics for the uncertain projects. The logic behind this approach is that the successful 
recognition of these factors helps the project managers to design projects so that they have 
the antecedents of a successful project (Söderlund 2011).  In the earlier literature the suc-
cess was defined rather rigidly and was often limited to the traditional “iron triangle” 
(time, cost, quality) criteria for success (Ika 2009), but the recent literature has challenged 
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this view and taken other criteria for success into account as well (Atkinson 1999, Shen-
har et al. 2001).  
Thirdly, contingency school searches for ideal setups for project organization and draws 
from organizational theory (Söderlund 2011). This school often recognizes different char-
acteristics of “project environment” that require different approaches from the organiza-
tional point of view. One classic example in the field of uncertainty management is the 
work of De Meyer et al. (2002)  who suggest categorization of projects by their uncer-
tainty and then adapting the management practices in the amount of recognized uncer-
tainty.  
Fourthly, behavior school is a diverse discipline on organizational behavior, which tries 
to solve uncertainty through the means of organizational processes such as communica-
tion, knowledge management or organizational learning. One example of this is the con-
cept of organizational learning, by which the organizations can diminish the uncertainties 
of the future projects (Grabher 2004). The temporal nature of project organizations and 
the uniqueness of the project makes this organizational learning particularly problematic 
(Sydow et al. 2004).  
Fifthly, governance school is focused on the administrating the project organizations and 
the stakeholder networks through control systems like contracts. Notable examples of 
developments in this field in recent years have been joint-risk management (Osipova & 
Eriksson 2013) and different types of alliances, that strive to divide the risks and rewards  
related to uncertainties so that the incentives strive stakeholders towards positive behav-
iors that support the project goal achievement (Love et al. 2010). 
Sixthly, relationship school has strong marketing origin, and it has similarities with the 
both governance and relationship schools of project management (Söderlund 2011).  This 
discipline also recognizes the importance of the early planning phase of the project and 
its importance on project management (Murtoaro & Kujala 2007), as well as the uncer-
tainties caused by the interorganizational conflicts (Vaaland & Håkansson 2003). Rela-
tionship school underlines the dynamic nature of the projects and stakeholder relations 
and argue that adequate time and managerial resources should be directed towards the 
relationship management.  
Finally, as the name suggests, decision school of project management is interested about 
different decisions that lead to the termination or continuation of the project (Söderlund 
2011). For these decisions it is usually crucial to understand the impact of uncertainty to 
the project, and therefore sensitivity or uncertainty analyses are often made of before ma-
jor decision points of the project (Leonard 2009). Improper understanding on uncertainty 
and bias can lead to the situation, where good projects are terminated, and the bad ones 
are being implemented (Matta & Ashkenas 2003).  
21 
These schools on uncertainty management literature can also be summarized into rougher 
two categories: authors who emphasize the element of planning, control and extensive 
risk management, and the authors who challenge this view and who emphasize uncer-
tainty management and flexibility (Koppenjan et al. 2011). As Koppenjan et al. (2011) 
recognizes, both strands of literature are a bit disconnected, even though in the real life 
project managers must deal with the both aspects of project management simultaneously. 
Table 5 summarizes these competing viewpoints on uncertainty management.  
Table 5. Comparing control and flexibility (Koppenjan et al. 2011). 
 Control Flexibility 
Terms of reference Blueprint Functional 
Task definition Narrow Broad 
Contract Task execution Functional realization 
Incentives Work-task based System-output based 
Change Limit as much as possible Facilitate as much as needed 
Steer Hierarchical Network 
Information change Limited, standardized Open, Unstructured 
Interface management Project management task Shared task 
 
Flexibility is often used in a rather loose manner, referring to the capabilities to respond 
to change and as a response to uncertainty (Rahrami 1992).  Flexibility is often used con-
cept in project management that refers to the project managers desire to adjust projects as 
more information is gained about the project context (Olsson 2006). For example, in Ols-
son’s (2006) study, flexibility was used always when it was a planned element in the 
project, and quite often also when it was not. Flexibility can be categorized in following 
six categories (Geraldi 2008, Osipova & Eriksson 2013): 
• What: Ability to define and change the scope and goals of the project, for example 
contractual flexibility 
• How: Ability to change how the project is implemented, for example the process 
or the instruments and tools used for project implementation 
• Who: Ability to change who is carrying out the tasks in the project 
• When: Ability to change when and in which order the tasks should be completed  
• Where: Ability to define where the project tasks are undertaken 
• How much: How rigid is the budget for the task, for example what is the budget 
responsibility for the actor responsible for the task 
However, both control and flexibility are equally needed in order for organizations to 
avoid becoming too rigid and on the other hand to avoid organizations to slip into chaos 
(Volberda 1999).  More concretely, according to De Meyer et al. (2002), the methods 
used to control the project should be selected according to the uncertainty profile project 
has. In the cases where a most of uncertainty is a result of variability and foreseeable 
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uncertainties, the emphasis should be more on controlling the uncertainty. On the con-
trary, when the emphasis is on unforeseeable uncertainties, the emphasis should be more 
towards flexibility and contingency planning. This is a similar conclusion to what Burns 
and Stalker (1961) arrive in their contingency theory: controlling management systems 
are sufficient for the stable projects and flexible systems for uncertain and changing pro-
jects.  
3.4 Differentiating interpretations on uncertainty 
Human psychology and differentiating interpretations on concepts are also on play when 
dealing with a complex and diverse concept such as uncertainty. This is true not only for 
participants of cost estimation process, but for the scholars as well: for most scholars, 
“risk” or “uncertainty” is not something that can be explicitly defined (Van Asselt 2000). 
Like Slovic (1987) puts this thought: 
“Human beings have invented the concept of “risk” to help them understand and 
cope with the dangers and uncertainties of life. Although these dangers are real, 
there is no such a thing as “real risk” or “objective risk”.” 
Thompson and Dean (1996) propose that the reason why people interpret risk differently 
is that people have fundamentally differentiating concepts of risk. Empirical studies 
demonstrate that this is true at least when comparing the concept of “risk” that the laymen 
and the experts have (Slovic 1987). Other example can be found from the human tendency 
to be more worried about unlikely events with dire consequences (for example airplane 
crash) than repeated events with smaller damages (for example, car accidents) (Van As-
selt 2000). 
Slovic et al. (2005) proposed that these concepts of risks people possess could be catego-
rized as risk as feelings and risk as analysis. Risk as feelings “refers to individual’s fast, 
instinctive and intuitive” reasoning, and risk as analysis “to logic, reason, and scientific 
deliberation”. While the usage of intuition can be very effective for quick decisions, for 
uncertainty management these feelings can often result as less reliable in complex settings 
such as project management. (Slovic et al. 2005) Figure 4 applies this concept on to how 
the perception on uncertainty is formed.  
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Figure 4. Perception of uncertainty (De Meyer et al. 2002, Slovic et al. 2005). 
In project environments, there are de facto sources of uncertainty that can be categorized 
with the concepts of De Meyer et al. (2002). However, the interpretation and visibility of 
these uncertainties depends greatly on how the individual perceives uncertainty. Typi-
cally, both the analysis and the feelings are included into the decision making and these 
together form the individual’s perception on uncertainty.  
Classic way in the project management literature to analyze uncertainty is to assign a 
probability for it. However, even when the uncertainty is evaluated as probability, differ-
ent interpretations on the concept can be easily spotted. For example, the Bayesian school 
on probability interprets probability to express the current state of knowledge, and Bayes-
ian probability estimates are updated whenever new data emerges (Puza 2015). In con-
trast, classical frequentist school of probability treats probability in more deterministic 
way, i.e. believing that real-world phenomena have real, quantifiable frequency (Casella 
2017). These two viewpoints on probability treat it fundamentally different way, other 
seeing it as measurable concept and other as subjective belief state. It becomes easy to 
understand why organizations or individuals can understood uncertainty differently when 
already the basic concepts allow multiple interpretations over the subject.  
Different organizational functions take a very different look on cost estimation process. 
In a typical project setting sales function is more geared towards the initiating phase of 
the project, project function sees usually the implementation part and the business deci-
sion makers probably have the view over the whole project portfolio. This also introduces 
the own biases into the understanding of uncertainty as a concept. For example, salesmen 
are often seen to benefit from positivism (Rich 1999), and while this might have positive 
impact on sales, it might also include these positive biases into the cost estimation prac-
tices.  
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Regarding cost estimation, Flyvjberg (2009) categorized the biases involved into three 
categories: technical, psychological and political-economic biases. Technical biases oc-
cur due inadequate estimating techniques or from the estimator’s mistakes. Psychological 
factors include psychological bias towards optimism and the way planners have tendency 
to overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs. Finally, political-economical 
biases refer to the cases where actors involved in the cost estimation process have delib-
erate reasons to alter the results; for example in the political decision making when in 
order to get the project approval costs and uncertainties need to be understated. After the 
project has been approved, it is often difficult to cancel the project altogether even if the 
significant cost overruns are encountered. (Flyvbjerg 2009) 
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4. PROJECT COST ESTIMATION 
4.1 Project, Project Management and Project life Cycle 
Project is temporary undertaking which aims to create unique service, product or result 
(PMI 2008). It has a start and end date and involves a series of tasks and activities which 
consume resources (Munns & Bjeirmi 1996). Compared to this, the project management 
is the process of controlling the achievement of project objectives by allocating resources, 
scheduling, monitoring the progress and adjusting into changes from the initial project 
plan (Munns & Bjeirmi 1996).  
Project management generally aims for project success, and literature recognizes many 
ways to define this. Most common criteria in the literature includes quality of the out-
come, timeliness, budget compliance and a degree of customer satisfaction (PMI 2008). 
In the project management literature, cost, quality and schedule are often referred as the 
“iron triangle” due to their dominance in the literature in defining success, especially be-
fore 80’s (Ika 2009). Atkinson (1999) criticized this traditional view to be too much fo-
cused on the performance of project process, rather than into actual results, and proposes 
to also take into account other possible benefits of the project, like for example benefits 
for the stakeholders and to the organization itself. While it is true that the iron triangle is 
very limited view to define success, in this thesis the focus is even narrower and project 
success is evaluated as terms of staying within initial budget. This is necessary in order 
to focus on project cost management – other success factors are interesting in this thesis 
only through the lenses of cost management.  
Munns and Bjeirmi (1996) defined the six-stage model for the project: conception, plan-
ning, production, handover, utilization and closedown of the project. The initiating stage 
of conception and planning differs in the internal and external projects. In internal pro-
jects, this refers to the situation where the strategic need for the project has been recog-
nized by the top management and the process of planning the methods to achieve this 
strategic goal (Pinto & Slevin 1988). In internal projects this can be as straightforward as 
Munns and Bjeirmi (1996) suggest in their model – organization recognizes the need and 
makes the plan to achieve this goal. In contrast, in the project where there is buyer and 
supplier, the conception and planning stages construct from complex negotiation phase 
between the buyer and the seller in which the contents of the project are determined 
(Murtoaro & Kujala 2007). This negotiation stage constitutes from both conception and 
planning phase of the project life cycle – typically during negotiations unrefined first plan 
for the project is created and this plan is then fine-tuned after the contract is signed. Wil-
liams and Samset (2010) refer to this early phase in the project as the project “front-end”, 
which constitutes the activities from the initial idea of the project to the final decision to 
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execute the project. How the negotiation model of Murtoaro and Kujala (2007) and pro-
ject life cycle model of Munns and Bjeirmi (1996) are linked is presented in Figure 5.    
 
Figure 5. Project life cycle and the initiating phase (adapted from Murtoaro & Kujala 
2007, Munns & Bjeirmi 1996). 
Negotiations between buyer and supplier and the organizational limits create tensions and 
communicational challenges into the project and hence they increase the challenges for 
the project management.  Like Munns and Bjeirmi (1996) note, typically project team is 
involved in the stages of planning, production and handover, whereas the customer is 
interested from the whole lifecycle of a project. Therefore also the success criteria for the 
project is different for the customer who is evaluating the whole project lifetime, and for 
the project management which is mainly evaluating the success and performance from 
planning to handover (Munns & Bjeirmi 1996). It is notable that these limitations can also 
be seen internally in supplier organization: sales function is only worried of the success 
of the negotiations, project team may see only the phases of planning, production and 
handover and finally the service organization is involved only in the utilization phase with 
the customer.  
The stakeholder risk and uncertainty over the project as well as the influence are highest 
during the early phases of the project, and the “degree of freedom” decreases over time 
(Artto et al. 2001, PMI 2008). Most of the unanticipated surprises are often a direct con-
sequence from the decisions made in the early stages of the project, which underlines the 
importance of these early planning and cooperation between project stakeholders. 
4.2 Project cost management 
Project cost management is the process of estimating, budgeting, and controlling costs in 
order to complete the project within the approved budget.  Cost estimation refers to the 
process of developing approximation of the costs, based on the incomplete information 
or assumptions about the needed resources to complete the project. Budget determination 
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is a similar process, but also includes the resource gathering and typically official author-
ization of the project budget. Finally, the project cost control aims to keep the project 
under control in terms of cost by evaluating the project performance and doing necessary 
corrective activities. Figure 6 presents the typical overview on the process of project cost 
management. (PMI 2008) 
 
Figure 6. Project cost management process. Modelled after PMI (2008). 
At first glance cost estimation and budget determination seem to overlap quite a bit, and 
in small projects they can be even performed by the same group of people. However, 
especially in the bigger organizations and projects it is typical that these activities are 
done somewhat separately, for example, first solely by sales organization and later as 
cooperation between sales and project implementation organizations. Furthermore, these 
phases differ from each other also in the terms of concreteness – in budget determination 
phase the resources needed for the project are usually ready to be committed for the exe-
cution of the project, while in the estimation phase they are not always even involved. 
For reasons in this thesis these phases are evaluated as separate entities in cost manage-
ment process.  
Whole approach of controlling project cost does not of course make much sense without 
reasonably good estimations about the project cost. In the case where the estimation is 
prepared for the tender in the sales phase the role of the estimation is especially important 
– overestimated price results probably to the lost tender, and underestimated or even un-
realistic estimate will realize in the impossibility to meet the budget in the project imple-
mentation phase (Akintoye 2000). Even in the case that the project cost estimation is for 
internal purposes, the significance of good estimation cannot be neglected – the sensibil-
ity of the project cost control phase is only as good as is the original estimate.  
4.3 Estimating project cost 
PMI (2008) defines a cost estimate as a “quantitative assessment of the likely costs for 
resources required to complete activity”. There are a number of reasons why project cost 
estimate is essential for project management. Firstly, it works as a tool to for which the 
project decisions are based on and is key tool in the negotiations and in the decision of 
project feasibility. Without some sort of cost estimate it is often impossible to conduct a 
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decision on whether to undertake the project or not. Secondly, it sets a benchmark for 
which the project cost control can be based on. Without cost baseline it would be impos-
sible to track project costs during the project implementation. (Venkataraman & Pinto 
2011) 
PMI (2008) recognizes several inputs that typically are included in the process of cost 
estimation. These inputs to the process are illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Cost estimation inputs (adapted after PMI 2008). 
Project scope is the definition of the project, what it includes and what it does not (Cho 
& Gibson Jr 2001). It typically includes description of the project, key deliverables, pro-
ject boundaries and assumptions about the project (PMI 2008). Important part of the doc-
uments and procedures defining project scope is often work breakdown structure (WBS), 
which is a hierarchical breakdown of the project into its elements (Khan 2006). 
Project schedule is the description of the resource needs and their durations. This is usu-
ally closely linked to the human resource and project scope planning since the variation 
in duration usually also leads into variation in cost.  Organizational factors are processes 
that affect the cost estimates, such as estimation policies, concrete templates and historical 
information about the project costs. Environmental factors are anything that affect the 
project cost estimates in the project environment, such as the cost of the necessary pro-
curements. (PMI 2008) 
Finally, uncertainties or risks are important input for the successful cost estimation. As 
stated in chapter 2.1., even though the literature often talks about risks as parts of cost 
estimate, in the scope of this thesis term “uncertainties” is preferred to include both neg-
ative and positive elements of risk for project cost estimates.  Methods by which uncer-
tainties typically are taken into account in the cost estimations often includes risk regis-
ters, risk mitigation costs and different types of contingencies (PMI 2008).    
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The knowledge over project is the lowest in the project front-end, and simultaneously that 
is also the time when decision-makers can have the most crucial impacts over project 
provided that they have the right information. At the same time, estimation phase is made 
by humans and affected by psychological, organizational and political factors which 
makes correct estimates and good decisions even harder (Williams & Samset 2010). 
However, as the studies of Williams and Samset (2010) and Scheibehenne and von Helv-
ersen (2009) commented, smaller amount of information where the less relevant infor-
mation is omitted, can also help decision makers, provided that the information on which 
decisions are based on are selected carefully. Furthermore, in the front-end of the projects 
the quantitative estimates and assumptions tend to outdate fast, which creates further dif-
ficulties when trying to base decisions solely on the quantitative information (Williams 
& Samset 2010).  
4.4 Cost control and uncertainty 
After the project has started, the task of the project cost control is to track costs and help 
project manager to manage development of costs. Important concept in controlling the 
project costs is Earned Value Analysis, which compares actual work performed to date 
with the original budget (Fleming & Koppelman 2010). Based on this, the project man-
ager can then evaluate how the project is doing compared to the original cost and schedule 
estimates and how significant the possible overruns are (Reichel 2006). Figure 8 presents 
an example of the Earned Value Analysis. 
 
Figure 8. Earned Value Management. 
Planned value is the time-based budget created in the cost estimation phase, which is the 
originally approved budget for project completion (Reichel 2006). Due its shape cumula-
tive planned value curve is often referred as the S-curve (Anbari 2003). Tip of planned 
value curve represents the total project budget at completion (Anbari 2003), that is total 
planned cost at planned project completion date.  
Other concepts of Earned Value Analysis refer to what has actually happened in the pro-
ject. Actual cost of work to date, or project expenditures, are the cumulative costs that 
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have been spent to complete the project to date (Reichel 2006). In contrast, Earned Value 
represents the budgeted cost of accomplished work (Anbari 2003), and hence represents 
the actual value that was created with spent costs. Therefore, the difference between ac-
tual costs and earned value illustrates for project manager how much project is ahead or 
behind its budget, and finally difference between earned value and planned value repre-
sents the amount project is behind its budget.  
Two indexes representing project performance can be varied from the above values. Ac-
cording to PMI (2008), Schedule Performance Index (SPI) equals to Earned Value (EV) 
divided by Planned Value (PV), so SPI = EV/PV. In similar manner, Cost Performance 
Index (CPI) equals to Earned Value (EV) divided by Actual Costs (AC), so CPI = EV/AC. 
One of the uses for these indexes can be to forecast the actual cost of the project at com-
pletion: simplest method for this is to divide the Budget at Completion (BAC) by current 
CPI (Reichel 2006). 
Time-cost S-curves are also fundamentally linked to the uncertainty in the cost estimates. 
Planned values are estimated in the project front-end during the cost estimation (Reichel 
2006), which means that it is uncertain whether or not they will represent the final project 
costs. Cost uncertainty analysis is a process of evaluating the project uncertainties and 
their potential impact on project cost (Garvey et al. 2016). Methods for coming up with 
the values may vary, but the results will often yield possible S-curves for the future pro-
ject. Figure 9 represents these possible project budgets on cost-time axis.  
 
Figure 9. Link between S-curves and uncertainty. 
As can be seen, these possible project S-curves fall typically between worst and the best 
scenarios, and are typically distributed around the most likely value (Barraza et al. 2000). 
These distributions can be translated into cumulative probability distribution, which is a 
typical outcome of the uncertainty analysis. Example of this can be seen on the right in 
Figure 9. These can be used in the project estimation phase to determine the desired prob-
ability for meeting the project budget, if the estimators know the amount of scenarios 
where the project costs are lower (Barraza et al. 2000).  
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Current project management theory emphasizes the front-end phase of the project for 
controlling project costs (Olsson 2006). Logic for this lies in the fact that the decisions in 
the conception and planning phase have much more impact on the project cost than the 
decisions later in the implementation phase (Venkataraman & Pinto 2011). Interestingly 
enough, also the potential for errors is the highest in the project front-end due to the high 
uncertainty associated with the early stages of projects. Opposite is true for the actual 
costs realized in the project and the cost of changes made in the project, as both increase 
over time. These are illustrated in Figure 10.   
 
Figure 10. Potential for errors in estimates during project (adapted from Venkata-
raman & Pinto 2011, PMI 2008). 
It is also noteworthy, that often at least some parts of the project lifecycle costs are omitted 
in the cost estimate (Chatzoglou & Macaulay 1996, Sterner 2000). For example, typically 
for the project cost control purposes the implementation costs are estimated. However, 
sometimes some part of the planning might happen only after the project has been scoped 
and sales-phase has ended, which can lead to poor project plans (Van Genuchten 1991). 
In practice this can mean that the project cost overruns are encountered immediately in 
the project planning phase if the original scope was based on poor estimation.   
Project cost management process as a whole offers a good explanation why good estima-
tion practices for projects are valuable for early decision making and why producing good 
estimates remains so hard. Good estimates are also important for the project cost control 
as an important input and baseline against which actual costs can be compared (Barraza 
et al. 2000). Uncertainty must be realistically evaluated also from the cost control per-
spective, so that the baseline against which project performance is compared is realistic.   
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4.5 Methods for uncertainty analysis 
Many of the uncertainty analysis methods in use today have their root in the 50’s, for 
example PERT method (see Malcolm et al. 1959). The reasoning behind performing pro-
ject uncertainty analysis is to obtain understanding about the level of uncertainty associ-
ated with the project (Leonard 2009), and therefore one of its most important tasks is to 
evaluate and communicate the most critical risk elements to the decision-makers (Garvey 
et al. 2016). After the analysis appropriate mitigation or contingency plans can be imple-
mented or, in most extreme cases, project can be completely cancelled.  
Cost estimates are forecasts, so they include the element of uncertainty by default. Often 
in practice cost estimation process aims for single-point estimates and therefore lack com-
pletely the view on the uncertainties of the project (Leonard 2009). Garvey et al. (2016) 
define three levels of uncertainty related to the cost uncertainties: Cost estimation, system 
definition and requirements uncertainty. Firstly, cost estimation uncertainty refers to the 
uncertainty of costs associated with performing the individual tasks. Secondly, system 
definition uncertainty refers to the uncertainties in what inputs are actually needed to pro-
duce the desired result. Finally, requirements uncertainty refers to the possible ambiguity 
of the whole project definition and to the project results. These are illustrated in Figure 
11.  
 
Figure 11. Cost uncertainty (Garvey et al. 2016). 
Qualitative methods aim to describe the uncertainty in relation to project characteristics, 
such as complexity, technical details or contractual issues. Quantitative ways of estimat-
ing project uncertainty aim to evaluate the uncertainty associated with the project mathe-
matically by using appropriate probability distributions for meaningful project compo-
nents (Garvey et al. 2016). Qualitative and quantitative methods for uncertainty analysis 
are not exclusive, for example Chapman and Ward (2003) argue for the use of both meth-
odologies. According to the authors, “the effectiveness and efficiency of quantitative 
analysis is driven to an important extent by the quality of the qualitative analysis and the 
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joint interpretation of both” (Chapman & Ward 2003). The quantitative analysis can give 
meaningful information only when the characteristics of the project are properly under-
stood and analyzed.  
Shash and Al-Khali (1992) conclude in their study that contractor’s previous experience 
with the project type is the single most correlating factor with the accurate cost estimates. 
In similar manner, Akintoye and Fitzerald (2000) found out the main issue with the cost 
estimation inaccuracy to be the lack of substance knowledge of the cost estimators, insuf-
ficient documentation and insufficient time for cost estimate preparation. These are all 
factors that typical uncertainty analysis does not take into account, and which conse-
quently increase the inaccuracy of both cost estimate and the analysis on project uncer-
tainty. Whether the uncertainty analysis is performed with qualitative or quantitative 
methods, the key question with it is its reliability and accuracy. 
4.5.1 Qualitative methods for cost uncertainty analysis 
Traditional way of performing qualitative analysis is to gather a risk and opportunities 
map, and then accompany these with perceived probabilities and cost impacts for each 
identified risk and opportunity. Further characteristics may be included as well, such as 
urgency of the uncertainty or a categorization of uncertainties by their source or the area 
of the project that the uncertainty might affect. These risks can be gathered either from 
the past experiences, from the database of past realized risks or from the expert judgement 
of the project stakeholders. (PMI 2008) 
Mitchell et al. (1989) recognized how prospective hindsight, i.e. generating explanations 
for future elements as if they have already happened improved the decision-makers ability 
to form plausible explanations and root causes for future events. Klein (2007) applied the 
idea for project as “project pre-mortem”. Like the name suggests, instead of analyzing in 
retrospect why project failed, the method is to do this analysis before project start.  This 
requires gathering all relevant project stakeholders and the project team into the same 
session and asking them to imagine every possible reason why the project failed. Often 
in the typical risk mapping session participants are trying to think what might go wrong, 
but in the project pre-mortem the assumption is that the project has already failed. Ac-
cording to Klein, this often helps to surface potential uncertainties and concerns that are 
often not mentioned and remain therefore unknown for project decision-makers. Klein’s 
method is focused on the risk aspect of the uncertainties, and one could ask if the pre-
mortem analysis could be extended to the opportunities as well by imagining every pos-
sible reason why the project was a success.  
Project uncertainty can also be evaluated through project characteristics, such as com-
plexity. Good example of this is the novelty, technology, complexity and pace diamond 
of Shenhar and Dvir (2007), where the projects are analyzed against these four criteria to 
draw some conclusions about the potential uncertainties and the lack of organizational 
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capabilities associated with the project. In similar manner, 6 W’s framework of Chapman 
and Ward (2003) allows the potential uncertainties of the project to be mapped in the 
meaningful way. Both models rely on identifying the “usual suspects” of uncertainty and 
then adapting project management to correspond with the perceived uncertainty.  
4.5.2 Quantitative methods for cost uncertainty analysis 
Literature proposes many ways to define uncertainty quantitatively. Historical data acts 
as a common starting point for producing uncertainty estimates, the reasoning being that 
certain types of projects will encounter similar project cost overruns in the future as they 
did in the past. Often more sound way of estimating is parametric estimation, which 
means the identification of typical factors for the project that cause uncertainty. In the 
project context these can include for example such factors as project location, project type 
and project size (see for example Hegazy & Ayed 1998). It is also typical to accompany 
mathematical modelling into these estimates, for example regression (Trost & Oberlender 
2003) or neural networks (Kim et al. 2004). 
If the uncertainty is not analyzed based on project’s general characteristic, the other com-
mon way of performing uncertainty analysis is to perform some form of probability or 
sensitivity analysis either for the project cost components (Leonard 2009, Mohamed & 
McCowan 2001) or for the different project scenarios (PMI 2008). One of the simplest 
examples of this is the usage of three point estimates, in which the worst case, most likely 
and the best case values are defined to the project cost components, or the simple sensi-
tivity analysis, in which one project cost element is changed at the time and the impact 
on project costs are observed (PMI 2008).  
One of the most common methods for extending three point estimates is the Monte Carlo 
method, which was developed in the 1940 and it was first used to estimate the behaviors 
of neutron chain reactions, and it has since then spread to the wide range of different 
problems and disciplines (Eckhardt 1987). Monte Carlo is essentially a statistical sam-
pling technique, and the basic idea is to evaluate the probability distribution of the output 
variable by sampling the input variables repeatedly. In the context of analyzing risk and 
uncertainties associated with the business decisions the method was first proposed by 
Hertz (1964) who applied the method to capital investment decisions. Since then the pop-
ularity of the method has increased significantly, especially with the advances of infor-
mation technology and the general availability of the modelling and computational capa-
bilities that Monte Carlo simulation requires.   
In the field of project cost estimation, the process of Monte Carlo simulation goes roughly 
as follows (adapted from Greenland 2001, Chau 1995, Sadeghi et al. 2010):  
1. Divide the project into meaningful cost elements 
35 
2. Estimate the probability distributions of these elements, either from historical data 
or from expert judgement 
3. Determine the correlations between cost elements 
4. Simulate the project adequate amount of times (typically hundreds or thousands 
repetitions to produce the probability distribution for the total project cost 
Popularity of the Monte Carlo estimation can be explained by the fact that it is fairly 
simple to execute with the help of modern information technology and it can be scaled in 
the many different types of problems (Kroese et al. 2014). Furthermore, Monte Carlo 
offers insights into the randomness and therefore to the uncertainty: when properly done 
Monte Carlo can produce good insights into the potential variation, sensitivity and prob-
ability associated with the business problem (Hertz 1964).  
Downside of Monte Carlo method is, like with any mathematical model, that it is only as 
good as the data put into the model. Monte Carlo method can only take into account those 
parameters that are fed into the model, and therefore it can not prepare the organization 
for “unknown unknowns” (Baccarini 2005, Baccarini 2006, PMI 2008). Furthermore, 
success of Monte Carlo method requires that the probability distributions used with it are 
objective and realistic enough for realistic outcomes. When the uncertainty of the project 
increases, it becomes harder to produce good probability distributions.  
Producing probability distributions is not a problem when there is adequate amount of 
historical data available from past experiences, but unfortunately this is not always the 
case. Often uncertainty analyses are performed on the projects that are new to the per-
forming organization or, alternatively, prior data from past projects is not valid or avail-
able from some reason. In this situation it is possible to base possibility distributions to 
the expert judgement, but this creates a conflict between simplicity and objectivity of the 
Monte Carlo simulation; often practioners make heavy simplifications and assumptions 
(Chau 1995). This creates a risk of drawing conclusions from the data that relies on the 
biased underlying assumptions (Sadeghi et al. 2010). If the expert opinion is biased, the 
outcome of the Monte Carlo simulation will be biased as well.  
Even though the rough process of performing Monte Carlo simulation remain the same, 
there is a wide variety of different extensions to the base methodology. Among suggested 
are the use of fuzzy sets (Sadeghi et al. 2010), extension of Monte Carlo with game theory 
(Madani & Lund 2011) or the integration of Monte Carlo methodologies to the cost con-
trol process (Acebes et al. 2014). Despite the advanced methodologies that exist in liter-
ature, it is good to note that in practice often very simplified version of Monte Carlo 
method is applied, and for example the independency of cost components and use of tri-
angular distributions are typical assumptions (Chau 1995, PMI 2008).  
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4.6 Contingency 
Outcome of quantitative uncertainty analysis is often cumulative probability distribution, 
or the S-curve, which then correlates the predicted project cost with their respective prob-
abilities (PMI 2008). This kind of approach allows decision-makers to adjust the project 
budgets to the desired risk they wish to take with project cost overruns, and allows man-
agers to understand the variation associated with the cost estimates (Hertz 1964). If the 
results of the uncertainty analysis are presented at time-cost chart, contingency can be 
understood as a difference between desired probability of reaching the project budget and 
most likely scenario. This is illustrated in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12. Contingency and uncertainty analysis. 
However, results of qualitative uncertainty analysis are not this easy to link into the con-
tingency. Often the results of qualitative uncertainty analysis is a register of risk/oppor-
tunity events (PMI 2008), which can affect the cost. However, lot of uncertainties usually 
still remain, for example of what is the probability of that risk event or when it could 
happen. If all these facts were known, typical risk event like this could be illustrated as in 
Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13. Contingency and risk event. 
Unfortunately, the amount of risks and opportunities recognized in a typical qualitative 
uncertainty workshop can be very high, and their probability is not usually reliably de-
fined (PMI 2008). This is also definition of qualitative uncertainty analysis – if the exact 
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probabilities of uncertainties would be known it would be qualitative uncertainty analysis. 
Therefore, contingency can not be claimed to represent any mathematical relation to all 
the risks; rather in these cases contingency that is defined qualitatively represents agree-
ment or educated guess about cost contingencies that is required to cover for unanticipated 
foreseen or unforeseen uncertainties. 
Traditionally contingency is understood as a buffer that is allowed for project costs that 
protects against cost uncertainty (PMI 2008), and its use is typical in the industries where 
the cost overruns are more of a norm than anomaly (Baccarini 2005). Despite the wide 
adaption of cost contingency concept, it is also very loosely understood among project 
management practioners, and therefore its applications vary (Baccarini 2005, Patrascu 
1988). Baccarini (2006) defines following four tasks for contingency:  
1. Contingency acts as a buffer for project costs 
2. Contingency represents the total financial commitment of the project or-
ganization to the project 
3. Contingency communicates uncertainties of the projects 
4. Contingency affects to the behavior of the project stakeholders 
Firstly, cost contingency as a buffer of money is how the contingency is generally under-
stood among project management practioners (Baccarini 2006, PMI 2008, Baccarini 
2005). This view is so common that there is a risk that contingency is understood only as 
a buffer. This easily leads to the conclusion that contingency is something extra that pro-
ject management should get rid of or that project should be accomplished without it. For 
example, Baccarini (2005) found out that the project cost estimators rarely in practice 
manage to link risk and contingency as concepts to each other, even though the two 
clearly are linked.  
Secondly, contingency with the base costs estimate represents the amount of money that 
is committed to the execution of the project (Baccarini 2006). However, this is not always 
the case: for example, if the contingency is calculated for the sales cost estimation pur-
poses by the supplier, it is often the case that the supplier has the obligation to deliver the 
project with agreed price despite of cost overruns. Furthermore, as Flyvbjerg (2009) 
notes, in the large projects it is often difficult to stop the project in the case of the project 
cost overruns start to occur. Nevertheless, contingency helps project stakeholders to form 
overall picture what is the expectation of costs and financial commitment (Baccarini 
2006). 
Thirdly, contingency is also a tool to manage uncertainties in the project. Amount of con-
tingency should be proportional to the level of project uncertainty (Venkataraman & Pinto 
2011), and should therefore also act as a tool with which decision makers can be informed 
about the uncertainty of the estimate. However, it is not uncommon to find practice where 
the amount of contingency is completely based on intuition and therefore very hard to 
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justify (Yeo 1990, Idrus et al. 2011, Baccarini 2006). This kind of fixed percentage or 
amount gives no information to the different stakeholders about the real uncertainties as-
sociated with the project, and in the worst case it communicates the false certainty asso-
ciated with the project cost estimate (Baccarini 2006).  
Finally, contingencies have implications on the behavior of project stakeholders: unrea-
sonable high contingencies can cause poor cost management and inefficiencies in the 
project implementation phase, while low contingencies can result to cost overruns and 
tensions between project stakeholders (Baccarini 2005). Finding optimal balance for the 
contingency and ensuring that it corresponds with the reality is therefore crucial for it to 
support project management and decision making.  
This study approaches contingency as a tool to communicate the uncertainty. Contin-
gency as a concept should match the uncertainties presented by De Meyer et al. (2002), 
and it is calculated on top of the base cost estimate which sums the expected costs for 
project items. Even though contingency is not bound to any specific cost item, it should 
be not thought as an “extra”; it should be seen as a part of the resources needed for project 
completion (Querns 1989). This is illustrated in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14. Contingency as a quantification of uncertainty. 
As can be seen in Figure 14, not all unforeseen uncertainties should be included in the 
contingency. For example Moselhi (1997) and Querns (1989) argue that the scope 
changes should not be involved in the contingency estimate. This is further supported by 
the views of project management practioners (Baccarini 2005). Simple reasoning for this 
is the fact that scope changes can change the nature or for example the size of the project 
significantly; it is unrealistic that the contingency should cover for example situations, 
where the content of the project doubles. 
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5. CREATING COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON 
UNCERTAINTY  
5.1 Organizational interfaces for cost estimation 
Often in the process of project cost estimating, there are multiple organizational functions 
involved in the process. For example, in construction projects large group of people con-
sisting of directors, project team, professional estimators, sales and procurement are usu-
ally involved, and it is not unlikely that the cost estimation is completely separate organ-
izational function itself (Akintoye & Fitzgerald 2000). In similar manner in other indus-
tries, many internal and external stakeholder groups are involved in the process; for ex-
ample, in the software-intensive projects cost estimation practices typically involve a 
wide range of experts from managers to programmers (Hihn & Habib-agahi 1991).  
In most project organizations sales and project organizations are separate units (Cooper 
& Budd 2007), and the study of these two interfaces has highlighted some typical issues 
in the organizational interface management. Sales function acts as the mediator of infor-
mation between the customer and the project function, and is often responsible for nego-
tiating and formulating the contract with the customer (Turkulainen et al. 2013). Most 
notably, as a part of this process the sales function is often responsible of forming the 
quotation and therefore of estimating the cost for the project. However, the best 
knowledge about different cost factors of the project is usually situated in the project 
function. Therefore, one of the main challenges between sales and project functions is the 
gathering of right information and communicating this information between the functions 
in timely manner (Terwiesch et al. 2002). This makes integration between sales and pro-
ject functions crucial to ensure successful projects (Turkulainen et al. 2013), and in the 
context of this thesis in ensuring the right estimation of the project costs. Figure 15 illus-
trates the differences between these two organizational functions.  
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Figure 15. Integration of sales and project functions (Turkulainen et al. 2013). 
The sales-project interface is not the only organizational interface from which similar 
issues can be recognized and which affect the cost estimation practice as well. For exam-
ple, Thamhain (2013) recognized that senior management is often not perceiving a strong 
link between risks and project performance. This kind of failure from the managerial side 
to understand the linkage between estimate result and the components which it is based 
on might introduce serious biases to the estimate or the interpretation of the estimate.  
It is therefore understandable that interdepartmental cognitive differences and interde-
pendence in project execution are a significant factor creating uncertainty and biases to 
the cost estimates (Adler 1995). In order for the project organization to process infor-
mation as a system despite the complex organizational structure, both amount of infor-
mation and the richness of information conveyed between the functions must be ensured; 
richness referring to the fact that often purely numerical or technical information is not 
enough to solve communicational problems (Daft & Lengel 1983). Face-to-face meeting 
between functions is an example of a rich information channel through which different 
organizational functions can communicate and increase common understanding. It is crit-
ical for successful cost estimates to take a look into the interaction processes between 
organizational functions and between vendors and clients to ensure that the current esti-
mation assumptions fit together with the project context and realities (Gopal & Gosain 
2010).  
5.2 Knowledge boundaries and boundary objects 
Organizational theory acknowledges the existence of organizational boundaries, for ex-
ample, between the organization and its external environment, between individuals and 
between different organizational functions (Aldrich & Herker 1977). In this thesis the 
main interest are boundaries between different organizational functions. Transferring 
knowledge and information across these organizational boundaries can be rather difficult 
(Bechky 2003) because individuals interpret their organizational surroundings from their 
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occupational position and tasks (Van Maanen & Barley 1982). Different organizational 
functions develop their own unique work cultures, language and gather their own unique 
knowledge (Bechky 2003).  
Norreklit et al. (2006) defined these sets of “accepted perspectives, concepts and argu-
ments” as “topoi”. Subjective topoi refers to the reality different actors have, which orig-
inates from the fact that there simply is too much information to be analyzed thoroughly 
for any individual or organization; therefore different actors develop their own sets of 
concepts through which they interpret reality. When these actors communicate, cooperate 
and interact, they construct shared, organizational topoi. These shared patterns of com-
munication and analysis, organizational topoi, can then be used to enable communication 
between different actors and to support decision making.  
Carlile (2002) defines three different views of knowledge boundaries that can exist be-
tween individuals and groups: 
1. Syntactic 
2. Semantic 
3. Pragmatic 
Firstly, syntactic boundaries refer to those that can be grossed with the help of common 
syntax, which is precisely and explicitly defined, such as math, programming code, lan-
guage or rules of accounting. Idea is that once different functions share a common syntax, 
it can be used to communicate across the organizational boundary. Many accounting and 
control practices fit well into syntactic definition of knowledge, and problem often arises 
with unexpected situations when the current syntax is not sufficient to process and trans-
fer the information. (Carlile 2002) 
Secondly, semantic boundaries are based on the notion that expression of knowledge, 
such as word “uncertainty” can have multiple meanings attached to it (Barthes 1977). 
Therefore, even if the boundary shares a common syntax, different functions can have 
different interpretations about it (Carlile 2002). Different concepts can have different 
meanings for different people, depending on their earlier experiences and background and 
current mental state; to put it short, human beings interpret their surroundings (Denzin 
1983). Communication across semantic boundary can sometimes be helped by forming 
“mutual understanding and making tacit knowledge more explicit” (Nonaka 1994). 
Finally, pragmatic knowledge boundaries also take into the account motivational and po-
litical aspects of boundaries by examining the consequences of the knowledge transfer. 
For example, when different functions have different organizational interests they might 
be reluctant to share the information they have. Approach takes into account that different 
parties participating in the knowledge sharing might have negative consequences on do-
ing so or at least have a feeling that knowledge sharing harms them. Therefore, the moti-
vation and incentives needs to be facilitated as well when working across knowledge 
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boundary, so that different actors are willing to share the knowledge they have. (Carlile 
2002) 
Interestingly, Flyvbjerg’s (2009) three accounting biases technical, psychological, and 
political-economical, seem to match perfectly to the knowledge boundaries categorization 
of Carlile (2002). This gives a good practical example on how these boundaries are in 
effect in practice in communication. When communicating accounting facts, mistake in 
syntax usually leads to technical errors. When semantic factors are in play and the com-
municating parties interpret reality differently this leads to different psychological biases. 
Finally, if the parties deliberately misinterpret or distort accounting information, it is an 
example of practical knowledge boundary and leads to political-economical accounting 
errors.  
Hinds and Pfeffer (2003) took a different approach to especially cognitive and motiva-
tional barriers in play when expert occupational workgroups share knowledge and these 
barriers of Hinds and Pfeffer are good examples of semantic and practical boundaries. 
These factors can be categorized in the following categories (Hinds & Pfeffer 2003): 
1. Expertise gap 
2. Tacit knowledge 
3. Disincentives and the lack of incentives 
Firstly, expertise gap refers to the phenomena of experts conceptualizing information they 
have that allows them to process information more rapidly, but which at the same time 
causes them to be unable to communicate this to the people not as familiar with the subject 
(Hinds & Pfeffer 2003). Naturally also the level of complexity of the information in-
creases with expertise, making information and the concepts that the experts have too 
difficult for people new to the field to understand. 
Secondly, tacit knowledge in contrast refers to the knowledge of the experts learnt 
through experience and that they are altogether unable to articulate or are even unaware 
of knowledge’s existence (Leonard & Sensiper 2011). Expertise gap and tacit knowledge 
as concepts are similar to “topoi” of Norreklit’s et al. (2006) in that they are based on 
human tendency to create models, simplifications and interpretations to make sense of 
reality.  
Finally, disincentives or the lack of incentives refer to organizational barriers that demo-
tivate individuals from transferring the information, for example due to fear that the in-
formation will be used against them (Orlikowski 1992). Incentives are therefore one im-
portant example of Carlile’s (2002) pragmatic knowledge boundary. 
Concept of “boundary object” is a concept that can be used to facilitate and explain ways 
to overcome these knowledge boundaries. In sociology, “boundary object” is an artefact, 
physical or abstract, that has different meanings or usages for the different social groups; 
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boundary objects “inhabit several intersecting social worlds and satisfy the information 
requirements of each of them” (Star & Griesemer 1989). Adopted in the field of manage-
ment, this means physical object or abstract concept used to convey information between 
different organizational groups and across knowledge boundaries, such as budgets, time-
lines, or enterprise management systems. Boundary objects can help the different occu-
pational communities to find “a common ground” and thus enable knowledge sharing 
(Bechky 2003). In business organizations boundary objects concept can be applied by 
accepting the fact that multiple meanings exist in different organizational functions, and 
then enabling and encouraging interaction with the help of boundary objects (Bechky 
2003).  
In addition to boundary object, in his study Carlile (2002) also adopts the concept of 
“ends”, which represents all those outcomes that different individuals or organizations 
aim for – such as signed sales deal, implemented project that met its budget or meeting 
target profitability. This might also include personal ends, such as higher salary, promo-
tion or avoidance of unpleasant tasks. To put it short, “ends” represents different motives 
that are affecting interaction and decision-making.  
Different actors communicating across knowledge boundaries can be analyzed through 
the lens of Carlile’s (2002) objects and ends framework. Ends help to shed the light to the 
different goals, incentives and motivations different actors have, and objects help to de-
fine what kind of concrete tools participants use that are related to their practice. Shared 
objects between practices, which convey different meanings for participants can be 
viewed as boundary objects. It is important to notice the difference in this framework 
between the objects and boundary objects: objects are something that only specific func-
tion is using in their internal culture that is essential for their profession; however, they 
are not used to communicate these concepts to the other functions. In contrast, boundary 
object is used by both functions and therefore it creates common ground and understand-
ing over project uncertainty. Figure 16 presents the example of this typology and different 
groups related to the project cost estimation practice.  
 
Figure 16. Object's and ends framework. 
In her study Bechky (2003) noted how workers disliked using official CAD drawings as 
a boundary object and preferred simple prototypes over them. This corresponds well with 
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Levina and Vaast (2005) concepts of designated boundary objects and boundary-objects-
in-use; designated boundary objects are those artefacts that are consciously designed to 
be boundary objects, and boundary-objects-in-use are those that the communities actually 
use when transferring knowledge. This categorization demonstrates how boundary ob-
jects are not always a result of careful planning and control practices of management; 
instead, they can sometimes be spontaneous ways through which different organizational 
functions learn to use for communication.   
Spee and Jarzabkowski (2009) studied how boundary objects concept can help to under-
stand the actual usages of strategy tools in organizations. According to  Spee and Jarzab-
kowski’s (2009), strategy tools are not always applied according to the procedure, their 
usage is shaped by the context in which they are created and their results are subject to 
interpretation in different organizational settings and functions. This is likely to be true 
also for other abstract concepts like uncertainty and uncertainty analysis, and therefore it 
is possible to use the concept of boundary objects to gain insights into why uncertainty is 
understood so differently across different organizational functions. More generally, same 
applies to cost estimates which are not based on the historical data but the expert estimate: 
Experts are also including their own biases, views and goals in the estimates.  
5.3 Communicating uncertainty through uncertainty analysis 
Uncertainty analysis, and its result contingency, can also be understood as boundary ob-
ject through which different organizational groups, such as sales, project team and man-
agement communicate the uncertainties they associate with the project. These groups are 
also likely to adapt differentiating views over this analysis and use the uncertainty analy-
sis for different purposes. For example, project manager might be interested about the 
most uncertain elements of the project, so they can be properly managed, whereas man-
agement might be more interested to know if the uncertainty associated with the cost is 
at the acceptable level.   
In this thesis the framework of boundary object is combined with the taxonomy of Slovic 
et al. (2005) presented in Section 3.4., uncertainty as analysis and uncertainty as feelings. 
Furthermore, boundary object is understood as uncertainty as analysis, through which 
different types of uncertainty recognized by De Meyer et al. (2002) can be analyzed in 
the project environment. Different organizational functions have different views on the 
sources of uncertainty that exists and is associated with the project. Different functions 
use their objects and ends, or analyses and feelings to map out the uncertainty of the 
projects and through those form their own perception on uncertainty.   
Uncertainty analysis as a boundary object steps into the picture when these functions then 
interact and communicate their perspectives on uncertainty across knowledge boundaries 
and hence form organization’s shared perspective on uncertainty. Uncertainty analysis 
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acts as a boundary object, through which different functions communicate their percep-
tions about the project uncertainty that they have grasped from the project environment. 
This analysis creates the shared perception on uncertainty, which in turn will affect dif-
ferent functions own perception on uncertainty. This influence can be seen for example 
if the functions change their attitudes and feelings towards project uncertainties or if they 
adopt or change tools to analyze uncertainty.  
Furthermore, as discussed in Sections 4.4. and 4.6, the two types of uncertainty from De 
Meyer’s et al. (2002) categorization that can be analyzed from the project environment 
are variation and foreseen uncertainty. That is because unforeseen uncertainty events are 
by definition something that can not be analyzed thoroughly, and therefore organization’s 
visibility to these remains limited. Starting point for the framework is therefore that there 
are two types of uncertainty analyses that can be constructed from the project environ-
ment: analysis on variation of the cost items and analysis of foreseeable uncertainties. 
These both act as boundary objects. This framework is illustrated in Figure 17.  
 
 
Figure 17. Uncertainty as boundary object. 
Without translating the perception of uncertainty through boundary object like uncer-
tainty analysis, different functions may try to communicate their perceptions through 
other means that might not be designed for the purpose. While these kind of boundary 
objects-in-use might be useful and work in some certainties, there is a risk that uncertainty 
is not really managed and that different functions continue to hold completely different 
views on uncertainty.  
Concept of boundary objects has been popular tool for many practice-oriented studies, to 
the extent that the original definition has often been stretched too far from the original 
concept (Lee 2007). And rightfully so, because if every meeting, process or table in the 
organization becomes boundary objects the theory loses its explanatory ability (Nicolini 
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et al. 2012). Every concept is not boundary object; boundary objects are meaningfully 
used in practice in different organizational functions and incorporated in their work (Star 
& Griesemer 1989). However, in the context of this thesis boundary object is useful con-
cept to understand and label the artefacts through which the uncertainty is communicated 
across organizational boundaries. Concept of boundary object forms a good framework 
for the purpose of this thesis through which the differentiating meanings and communi-
cation of the uncertainty can be evaluated. However, it is important to limit the usage of 
boundary objects into the objects that are related to uncertainty and not to fetch the scope 
of this thesis too far.  
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6. CASE COMPANY 
6.1 Information gathering about the case company 
This chapter presents overall information about the case company and its current cost 
estimation practices, and it is based into various interviews with different functions which 
were executed at the beginning of the thesis project. These interviews and extensive dis-
cussions are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6. Interviews and extensive discussions. 
Position Number 
of inter-
viewees What was the information gathering purpose 
Regional manager 2 Overall process of the project deliveries, Current practises, 
best practises, examples of cost overruns 
Head of Project and 
Customer Services 
1 Overall process of the project deliveries, Current practises, 
best practises, examples of cost overruns 
Sales Manager 5 Tools and analysis used by the sales function, overall sales 
process, best practises, problems in the estimation 
Project Manager 5 Tools and analysis used by the project function, overall project 
characteristics, best practises, problems in the estimation 
Application Manager 2 Projects over 10 million euros in revenue and their specific 
characteristics 
Project Coordinator 3 Tools and analyses executed by coordinators 
Sales Support 3 Sales process, best practises, current problems and inconsist-
encies across sales function 
Product Manager 2 Specifics of the case company’s products 
Controller 2 How costs are allocated and estimated for the products, KPI's 
of projects and sales functions 
IT/ERP expert 2 How case company's systems are used, what problems are 
present in the current tools 
Executive Vice Pres-
ident 
1 How top management understands the uncertainty, what they 
lack in their decision making 
Legal 1 Legal risks of the projects, management of these risks, tools 
and processes used for legal risk management 
In total 29  
 
There was not overall question structure for these interviews, overall goal was to gather 
information about the process, different functions and their tools, how uncertainty was 
understood in general in the case company and what problems and issues there were in 
the case company. It was also necessary for the researcher to understand how the tools 
were used in the case company and what limitations these had as well as background 
information about the products and customers to completely understand the project envi-
ronment. Even though the questions changed to each interview, notes were kept of these 
interviews and the main points were written after these interviews.  
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In addition to gathering information by interviewing people at the case company, re-
searcher was given access to the notes and files of past projects, which provided also 
valuable information about past tools and techniques. This data also allowed to calculate 
significance of past cost overruns and old “lesson’s learnt” files of the closed projects 
contained rich source of typical project failures and issues that was used to understand 
case company’s projects.  
Case company is Finnish high-technology company offering a wide variety of different 
products and services to its customers. Product offering of the case company is notably 
diverse, ranging from the small devices to customized system solutions. Furthermore, 
case company is serving customers in over 150 countries, and customers include both 
public and private entities and from the wide range of different industries. This mixture 
of wide product portfolio and customers then causes a high mixture of different sales 
channels and customer contacts.  
This thesis focuses specifically on the project sales of the case company, which are large 
deliveries that are customized for the customer’s needs. Also, if the delivery has high 
amount of risk or tailored services, it is considered as a project. Total volume is annually 
around 300 projects. Even project deliveries of the case company are diverse group of 
ventures since they range from small projects of tens of thousands of euros to large pro-
jects of millions of euros. Typical content of the projects varies a lot; while some projects 
focus exclusively on delivering one product type, others consist of bundles of different 
systems. Finally, projects can include multiple locations and project sites.   
This causes significant uncertainties and variation to project deliveries. However, due to 
large product portfolio the cost overruns are quite balanced on the portfolio level. Espe-
cially the larger projects are interesting for this thesis, considering that the uncertainties 
and potential cost overruns associated with them are large as well. This was also acknowl-
edged in the case company and the motivation for the company to participate in this thesis 
was to better control the larger projects and their costs. Other factor than size causing 
uncertainties is the global nature of delivery projects, as for example different local con-
ditions, legislation, work cultures and taxation cause variation and unforeseen events in 
the projects.  
6.2 Sales process of the case company 
Project sales in the case company can be characterized as a long-term process of promot-
ing case company’s solutions for the customer. Sales process in the case company is di-
vided into distinctive phases, and each phase ends with the decision-making gate in which 
it is decided whether to continue sales process and what actions are taken. Rough descrip-
tion of the sales process is presented in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. Sales process of the case company. 
The beginning parts of the process aim to identify and influence the customer needs, 
whereas the latter part of this process is more about generating well-thought proposals 
and closing the sales deal. Quite typically the case company is responding to the open 
tender, so the specifications are quite strictly defined from the customer’s side. However, 
also in these cases it is usually possible for the company to begin the discussions with the 
potential customer before the official request for quote is published. Case company also 
participates into cases where there is no public tendering process, and in these cases the 
sales can more freely specify the systems and solutions they offer for the customer.   
Sales managers have the responsibility over the sales process, but they are supported by 
other functions of the case company. Most heavily involved in the supporting of project 
sales process is naturally the project function. Typically, it provides schedules, work es-
timations, technical support, evaluation of delivery terms and subcontractor analysis. 
Other typical support functions are product managers, who can provide sales with details 
about the product involved in the project delivery, for example what kind of modifications 
can be done for the product. When preparing the contract with the customer legal function 
supports sales by helping to draft or negotiate a contract where risks and rewards are 
balanced with customer.  
6.3 Project delivery process of the case company 
After the sales function has managed to close the deal, the case is handed over for the 
project function. This also means that specific project manager is named for the project 
that will oversee project execution. Project manager can sometimes be the same who sup-
ported sales in the sales phase, but this is not always achieved if that project manager 
becomes heavily involved into some other project during the course of sales process. The 
aim of the project delivery process is quite naturally to fulfill the customer expectations 
created in the sales phase as efficiently as possible. Even though the project planning has 
already started in the sales phase, it is up to the project function to finalize these plans, 
then oversee the execution and finally handle the project over to the customer and poten-
tially to the service function, which may continue provide the customer with maintenance 
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and technical services associated with the products. Project delivery process is described 
in Figure 19.  
 
Figure 19. Project delivery process of the case company. 
Handover to projects happens in the beginning of the project delivery process in a separate 
meeting with sales. In that meeting the goal is to share information about the sales case 
and interactions with the customer during the sales phase. This is a critical step in the 
process, as the sales function rarely continues to support project execution phase after the 
handover to project function is done.  
Like stated in the Section 3.1., very often project planning is not finalized during the 
project front-end in the sales phase. This means that project delivery process starts by 
updating the budgets and creating the first forecasts of the project, as well as making 
technical planning for the projects. Even though it is preferable to have plans as ready as 
possible already in the sales phase, often customer’s schedule or buying process does not 
allow this, and hence final subcontracting plans and technical specifications are often 
finalized in the project phase. 
After project has ended and the open issues in the project have been resolved, final project 
meeting is held to document the lessons learnt and to analyze the project from different 
perspectives, such as financial, schedule and customer satisfaction perspectives. Sales 
function participates to this review as well to learn about the mistakes or successes that 
took place during the project execution.   
6.4 Future plans and current issues 
Recently case company has increased the sizes of projects it undertakes; instead of re-
sponding to requests to quote, the idea is to increasingly execute projects that consist of 
several sub-systems and proactively market these projects to the customers. This ap-
proach means significant increase in terms of project size, and while the case company 
has undertaken big system deliveries before, the size of 10-30 million projects it now 
actively seeks is something new. This increase of size of the projects has increased man-
agement concerns over the possibility of encountering significant project cost overruns; 
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these new projects are simply “too big to fail” compared to the overall size of the project 
portfolio.  
In these larger ventures case company positions itself as turn-key provider, and has there-
fore increased control over the different aspects of the project. In contrast, previously in 
many of the past projects the case company has delivered its products to the integrator 
who is undertaking a bigger project for the end-customer. In these cases, case company’s 
project delivery has been just a small sub-project from the integrator’s and end-cus-
tomer’s perspective. This model has sometimes caused communication issues with the 
end-customer, as there is other organization between the case company and the end-cus-
tomer. However, working as a turn-key provider increases the complexity of the projects, 
as the case company is responsible from everything related to the project and not only 
about the delivery of its own products. This is the second factor increasing the concern of 
the management about the project cost overruns, as managing extensive subcontracting 
is not among the core competences of the case company and this often increases the risk 
associated with the delivery.  
Proactive selling of these projects means that the customers do not always have clear idea 
of the project’s specifications, as they do when the project is sold through tendering. Cus-
tomers might have clear needs, but as part of the sales process it is crucial to translate 
these into meaningful system specifications. Furthermore, the lack of initiative from the 
customer’s side means that they may lack procurement know-how and might not be fully 
aware what the system’s integration and deployment might require from their organiza-
tion. These aspects increase the challenges of interacting with the customer and managing 
their expectations, and clearly communicating what is required from their side despite the 
use of term “turn-key”.  
Case company’s tools and processes are not always tailored for project deliveries, as they 
have to serve other types of deliveries as well. Especially challenging are larger projects, 
as for example the cost estimation or quoting tools are completely unusable with the com-
plexity of these new larger delivery projects. This manifests into usage of tailored excel 
spreadsheets, but their usage is dependent on the skills and tendencies of individual sales 
managers and causes unsystematic practices for cost estimates. Same goes for the risk 
management process, which has not been tailored to inspect the risk of large ventures.  
Despite these challenges, the case company wants to continue to sell these larger deliver-
ies from several reasons. First of all, they offer opportunity to establish intimate relation-
ship with the customer and to tailor the offering exclusively for customer’s needs. Sec-
ondly, there is not many other companies capable of delivering these complex systems, 
which decreases the threat of competition in these larger cases. Finally, large projects also 
mean increased revenue, which is naturally interesting for any company seeking growth. 
The only issue currently therefore is the increased risk for cost overruns, and that needs 
to be minimized in order to continue successfully deliver also large turn-key projects.   
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6.5 Current cost and uncertainty estimation practices 
Sales function is the main function responsible of forming the cost estimates for project 
sales. Process mainly takes place in the “prepare proposal” phase from Figure 18, but 
exceptions exist: for example, customers might want to have a non-binding budgetary 
quote in order to reserve adequate amount of money for their investment budgets, and in 
this case rough cost estimate is quickly prepared. The process for cost estimation includes 
often many other functions, such as project function, services, product managers and oc-
casionally legal or financial functions. Despite of this, process can still be described in 
quite straightforward manner. The cost estimation process is presented below in Figure 
20.  
 
Figure 20. Case company's cost estimation process. 
The process for cost estimates naturally starts from the solid understanding of the cus-
tomer’s needs, so that the “right project” is estimated. Often from the sales side this also 
requires discussions with the product managers to obtain the latest information what the 
case company can deliver. Estimates that are formed on the offering that do not match 
customer needs or that require heavy unanticipated modifications are common causes for 
major estimate error and later for cost overruns (Jackson 2002, Lee Jin-Kyung 2008, 
Shane et al. 2009).  
Case company uses Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system, in which the quotes can 
be formed. The preliminary quote is usually prepared by obtaining the quoted items from 
ERP. The ERP contains costing and gross margins for different products, which are main-
tained by their respective product managers. This means that once the material and the 
hardware of the project is known, the pricing process is rather automatic for material 
components. In the case company, gross margin for products is sales price of the product 
minus its inventory price.  
Variable costs, like work estimates, installation costs or subcontracting, cannot be ob-
tained from the ERP. Variable costs are cost items that depend on many of the details of 
the project, for example from the target country, amount of customization that customer 
needs, available subcontractors, and local legislation. Current practice is that the sales 
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asks for estimates from the different functions that have the best capabilities to estimate 
these costs. For example, experienced project managers have quite vast amount of tacit 
knowledge about the amount of work that delivering certain system requires.  
Subcontracting, such as civil works, can often form a big part of the project costs. Esti-
mation of these is highly dependent on the amount of available information and the time 
available for estimation. In the simplest form and especially when the estimation process 
happens under time pressure, estimate can simply be based on the historical cost infor-
mation of the same type of delivery to the similar region. When there is plenty of time to 
use for the estimation, quotas from the potential subcontractors are asked and the details 
of subcontracting are verified by visiting customer’s sites where the project will be exe-
cuted. 
Finally, other aspects that can have the impact on costs of the project are estimated. These 
include risks, legal aspects and the cash flows of the project. However, the case company 
lacks culture where these aspects are regularly taken into account in the cost estimates; 
even though the risks, cash flows and contractual terms are (almost) always reviewed, 
only occasionally are these calculated into cost estimates. Therefore, the goal of the re-
view is to determine whether risks are acceptable; there is currently often no middle 
ground option available where risks affect project costs. One typical example of the situ-
ation when risk is calculated in estimates is when the contract includes penalties from 
schedule overruns and the case company knows that it will be unable to deliver by the 
deadline. However, if the impact of risk, cash flow or contractual term is less clear, these 
are not calculated into the estimates. 
After the content and the gross margins of the products and different services have been 
calculated, the gross margin of the whole project is evaluated to determine if it is accepta-
ble and profitable for the case company. Decision makers know approximately the gross 
margin percentage that the project needs to have for the project portfolio to stay profitable 
on the company level. In addition, competitive situation is analyzed; when it is expected 
that the project is under heavy price pressure from other competitors, this might influence 
the target gross margin that the decision maker has in mind. The current amount of deliv-
ery projects has an effect as well; in the situation where the case company has more pro-
jects than it can deliver the gross margin is raised, and vice versa. This analysis might 
lead into some changes in project pricing and hence to the target gross margin that the 
case company aims for.  
6.6 Current understanding on costs and uncertainty 
One of the main purposes of immersing into the cost estimation activities of the case 
company was to find out what is the state of understanding on uncertainty and cost esti-
mation in the case company. As the case company lacked the function for project estima-
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tors, the practices regarding estimation and management of uncertainty were very versa-
tile, as each project manager and salesperson applied a bit of their own methodology to 
the practices. While the main process and the ERP tool were utilized, it was common that 
both project managers and sales managers had their own tools for cost estimation, namely 
spreadsheets.  
The reason for this was that ERP system was only designed to hold product and cost 
information, but it or any other tool in the use of company was not suitable for cost esti-
mation. Spreadsheets were often very flexible and efficient tool for project sales, but their 
drawback was they were almost always personal copies and it was therefore difficult to 
gather detailed cost information in entirety. This caused situation where the cost infor-
mation did not update automatically on these spreadsheets, causing instances where old 
cost information was used for estimation purposes.  
It was not only the use of tools that was very diverse. The whole understanding about the 
cost elements used in the cost estimation process and furthermore the understanding over 
project uncertainty seemed to vary a lot from one individual to another. The main differ-
ences in cost understanding were spotted in the understanding on what gross margin and 
product inventory cost actually meant, and about the understanding on uncertainty level 
of the estimates found in the case company’s ERP system. In similar manner, since the 
uncertainty was assessed in the case company only through crude top level risk review, 
the perception over the significance of uncertainty varied a lot. Top level risk process in 
this case meant that risk assessment had rough categories, but it was up to the sales man-
ager to decide what he understood with for example “technical risks” and what was in-
cluded in the analysis.  
For individual products, the cost estimate is known as product inventory cost (PIC), which 
is available at the company ERP system. However, what many of the sales managers and 
cost estimators of the case company do not realize is that the concept of PIC that the case 
company is using does not equal the traditional business concept of “cost of goods sold” 
(COGS). This is because on the company level, the “cost of goods sold” contains not only 
PIC, but also project costs and “other COGS”. This causes the gross margin on the com-
pany level to differ from the gross margin on the project level. This is illustrated in Figure 
21.  
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Figure 21. Understanding on project cost structure. 
At the project level, term used about project costs is PIC. In the sales phase project costs 
are included in the PIC of the project, so they behave in a similar way as any material 
product. Other COGS in the company include for example overheads from sourcing or 
outbound logistics, which are excluded from the gross margin at the company level, but 
not at the project level. This causes discrepancies when analyzing project gross margin 
and comparing it to the company’s gross margin: these numbers do not include the same 
things. Differences are typically around 5%, which is significant difference when analyz-
ing project profitability, as that 5% can easily equal the amount of company’s net profit 
from the project business.  
This can also lead to logical biases when pricing the project items. While generally other 
COGS are only some percentages of the total project costs, there are items where they 
can be over half of the products sales price. On practice this means that when the sales 
manager is evaluating the pricing of the single items, he sees huge gross margins on these 
products, as the other COGS are not included. There had then been cases in the case 
company where this leads to the logical conclusion in sales manager’s head that it is safe 
to give discounts from these items, while in the reality these products can be barely prof-
itable for the company.  
While the financial function was aware of this and its impacts, it was clear that the sales 
and project functions were not. It was also not clear if all the decision makers of the 
company understood what was included into different elements of the project costs at the 
project level and what impact this had on the company level.  This leads to the bias among 
different organizational functions, as it seemed that the projects were being more profit-
able than they really were.   
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Similar biases were uncovered in the interviews regarding the work estimates associated 
with the products. Company’s ERP system has templates that salespersons may use to 
form a new project quote for the customers. These templates also hold simple work break-
down on the task level and some values for these tasks. However, it was not at all clear 
for different functions what these estimates represented. While they were never used for 
actual, contractually binding quotes, sales managers sometimes used them for budgetary 
quotes or basis for negotiations. Among sales it was thought that these values were based 
on the historical data or the actual estimate about the amount of work it takes to deliver a 
product. In contrast, project function was not aware at all about these estimates and as-
sumed that the work estimates were always to be asked from the project manager. Truth 
was that product manager created these estimates, and they were very crude estimates 
about the actual amount of work. 
Uncertainty as analysis was not adapted systematically in different functions, as case 
company lacked the formal procedure for uncertainty management. Different actors were 
using mainly the lessons learned from the past projects to form a view on the uncertainty. 
The top-level risk management process of the company trusted a lot to the sales managers 
and their ability to recognize risks from the operating environment. Exception to this was 
the legal function, which had formal training and education over recognizing contractual 
risks and uncertainties caused by the vagueness of the contract.  
If past projects were used as lessons learned, on the feelings on uncertainty it was often 
the projects that sales manager and project manager had participated that had the greatest 
impact on the project manager’s perception on uncertainty. Especially the last project that 
the estimator had participated had an impact on how optimistic they were regarding cost 
estimates. In addition, the interaction inside the company and between sales and the cus-
tomer were influencing a lot to uncertainty perception. For example, when the salespeople 
had long relationship with the customer, both parties adopted more optimistic views on 
the project’s uncertainties.  
Expertise gap explained well different perception on uncertainty. Each function empha-
sized the risks related to their area of expertise, and project function was the only one that 
had actual experience on dealing with the project risks. There were examples where sales 
had sold complex modifications to company’s products without realizing the amount of 
work this would cause for the project function in the project implementation phase.  
6.7 Objects and ends 
When each function has different views on uncertainty, it is understandable that each 
function communicates and manages uncertainties regarding cost estimates differently. It 
turned out that current boundary objects used to convey information on project uncertain-
ties were not suitable to produce a clear picture about the uncertainties regarding the pro-
ject. Each part of the organization was holding its own pieces of information regarding 
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project risks, but these were not actively shared with other organizational functions. The 
case company did not have culture for incorporating uncertainty in the estimates. This 
was a bit surprising because, when discussing with different functions, concept of risk 
and risk for cost overruns were clearly recognized. However, when it was time to make 
cost estimates for projects, very deterministic, even optimistic view was adopted.  
Some interviewees held the view that this was due the high variance in the company’s 
projects. In majority of company’s projects, it was acceptable approach to ignore the ef-
fect of uncertainty since the projects were so small that the effect of uncertainty on project 
portfolio level was insignificant. Furthermore, sales managers were often also responsible 
of selling instruments or systems – and when selling these the whole concept of uncer-
tainty was unnecessary. In the larger projects this ignorance of uncertainty in the estimates 
and in communication could led to the situation where it was almost guaranteed that the 
project would overrun its budget since in these bigger deliveries something unexpected 
happened always.  
When analyzing the ends of different functions, it can be seen that each function holds 
differentiating goals regarding project cost estimation. This created biases to the estimates 
and altered the information each boundary object possessed. For example, due the nature 
of their work and incentives, it was important for the sales to increase the amount of sales 
and to close the deal; this often lead to the temptation to give discount to the customer. 
However, decision makers of the company wanted to create pressure on sales managers 
for them to sell project with as good gross margin as possible. This then created incentive 
for the salesperson to be overly optimistic about different estimates in the project and 
disregard the cost of the risk. From different perspective, when the project function was 
responsible of estimating the costs, it wanted to add buffers so that it could ensure that it 
can deliver what was promised.  
These examples do not represent all the members of these functions but describe well 
what kind of situations differentiating ends caused in the case company. Realistic cost 
estimation was not on anyone’s agenda. These ends, objects and boundary objects be-
tween different organizations are summarized in Figure 22.  
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Figure 22. Objects and ends framework of the current situation. 
In the figure above, it is important to note that boundary objects hold both information 
about the costs as well as from the uncertainties. Between sales function and the customer, 
the sales price is fixed, so the information on uncertainty is communicated through con-
tract to determine what happens in the unexpected situations.  
Project and sales were communicating about the cost estimates with spreadsheet tool, into 
which project manager estimated the amount of work project would require. This estimate 
was based on the personal viewpoint of the estimating project manager, so it was not 
surprising that these estimates varied a lot from project manager to another. This spread-
sheet tool did not have any means to analyze uncertainty, so the only way to include that 
in the estimates for project manager was to add buffer. This then in turn created illusion 
for the sales manager that there was inefficiency in the project organization.  
Sales, project function and decision maker were communicating cost estimates and un-
certainty mainly with the contract and the quote, which had deterministic calculations 
about different components and their price on the project. Some sales managers under-
stood that some buffer for uncertainties were necessary, so they included them into the 
quote. It was therefore impossible for the other functions to know based on the quote 
whether uncertainty was included into the cost estimation or not, and they had to trust to 
sales manager’s words that the quotation calculation was in place and had enough buffer.  
Finally, what was further complicating the things was again the concept of PIC. The re-
sponsibility to update these were at the product managers, but according to the interviews 
they were generally communicating changes in the PIC poorly. This meant that the 
changes in PIC were often surprises for the other functions. This led to frustrating situa-
tions for the sales and project managers alike, when the profitability of their projects 
would drop suddenly.  
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Objects and ends framework revealed the disintegrated nature of the case company’s un-
certainty estimation practices and very diverse viewpoints about the project cost uncer-
tainty. It was therefore evident that there was a room for intervention in integrating these 
practices into more formal way of processing and analyzing uncertainty information. 
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7. INTERVENTIONS 
7.1 External interviews 
First intervention executed for the case company was a benchmark study of the uncer-
tainty estimation practices in the Finnish project-based industries. The reason to catego-
rize these external interviews as an intervention rather than information gathering is that 
the goal of these interviews was to gather best practices, tools and issues from the other 
industries and then to adapt this information for crafting the further intervention for case 
company’s cost and uncertainty estimation process. Motivation for these was then mainly 
to fill information needs of the case company rather than fill gaps in the literature. Fur-
thermore, these interviews provided the researcher with the expertise about the uncer-
tainty estimation tools in use, which could be later used when championing for change 
and implementation of new uncertainty estimation tools in the case company. Practical 
sales and project managers are more interested to start using something when they hear 
that it is in use in other industries, rather than being just academic tool.  
External interview questions were planned around four thematic topics: 1) Uncertainties 
associated with the project and the cost estimates, 2) cost and uncertainty estimation pro-
cesses, 3) tools and methods actually in use for forming cost and uncertainty estimations 
and finally 4) best practices and issues that the usage of these processes and tools resulted. 
First theme provided the background of the projects and gave some understanding what 
interviewees understood with the uncertainty. Second and third theme provided actual 
methods for uncertainty estimation. Fourth theme revealed reality behind certain tools or 
at least the estimators view about practicalities of forming cost and uncertainty estima-
tions.  
As the case company’s projects were complex ventures including elements of at least civil 
engineering, software engineering and machine deliveries, it was also natural to select the 
interviewed companies from different industries. In total 7 Finnish companies were ap-
proached, from which 5 answered positively for the idea of being interviewed for the 
research purposes. Method for finding interviewees was first to draft a short list of com-
panies with a good reputation, and then through connections and cold calling reach the 
person(s) whose responsibilities include cost and uncertainty estimations for project sales 
phase. Finnish companies were selected solely because of their location in the same coun-
try with the main case company; this allowed the interviews to take place face-to-face 
and allow richer communication compared to the interview that would have happened for 
example via phone or email. The conducted interviews are presented in Table 7.  
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Table 7. External interviews. 
Company 
Number of 
interviewees Profile of interviewees 
Length of 
interview 
Types of 
projects 
A 1 Cost estimation engineer 79 min 
Construction 
projects 
B 1 Cost estimation engineer 53 min 
Construction 
projects 
C 2 
Sales manager, Service man-
ager 80 min 
Software pro-
jects 
D 2 
Cost estimation engineer, Direc-
tor of Project management sup-
port unit 80 min Power plants 
E 2 Project control engineers 75 min 
Project con-
sultants 
 
As the idea behind the interviews was not to analyze each entity thoroughly, this thesis 
will not go systematically through each of the interviewed companies but rather focus on 
findings from those interviews. Interviewees themselves felt more at ease to reveal their 
practices and issues when they knew that the information they provide will not be traced 
into their specific company. Since the aim in this thesis is not to provide findings from 
specific company or from the specific industry, this thematic analysis of the interviews is 
justified. 
Even though the external interviews had themes, these were not always followed system-
atically. In some of the cases the interviewees had concrete examples to show about their 
processes or tools in use, for example about their spreadsheets or software they used for 
estimations, and it made more sense to listen carefully the interviewees explanation of the 
usage of the tools and then increase the details with spontaneous specifying questions. 
However, during the interviews it was checked that all the themes were discussed through 
at some point. The example of the interview questions can be found in Appendix 1.  
7.1.1 Uncertainties associated with the projects 
Interviews started with questions about what kind of uncertainties interviewees associate 
with their projects and what are the causes of the uncertainty in their projects. Some un-
certainties were clearly specific to the respective industries of the interviewees, such as 
the uncertainties of the soil in the construction projects or the impact of technology in the 
software projects. Despite of these industry specific uncertainties, responses had also 
striking similarities across different industries. The initial idea with the questions was to 
pinpoint uncertainties in the project environment, but it turned out to be that many of the 
uncertainties interviewees listed were uncertainties of the project’s delivery process. This 
supports the notion from the literature that the uncertainty is often a problem of project 
management and that many times the external and internal reasons for uncertainties are 
linked (for example De Meyer et al. 2002).  
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First common element that the interviewees brought up in one form of another was control 
over the project and the estimation process. According to the interviewees, when the com-
pany has the control over the estimation process and the delivery project, there is less 
uncertainty. The logic was that when the company gets to plan the project on its own, it 
knows the solutions and decisions made in the planning phase and has greater degree of 
visibility over what is to be delivered.  
Other element, which often was caused by the lack of control, was the lack of resources 
or rush with the estimations. According to the interviews, tight schedules were often to 
blame for inadequate estimates and hence caused uncertainty. When there was no time 
for proper analyses, it was impossible to know what uncertainties were associated with 
the project or to know how accurate the cost estimate is.  
Third common element was the amount of detailed planning and design done for the pro-
ject for which the estimates were based on. This is naturally linked to control and the 
schedule of drafting cost estimations: when there was not enough time to do proper study 
of the projects, the uncertainty was greater. Similarly, if the project plans were rigid and 
given from the customer’s side or if the planning involved a lot of previously unknown 
stakeholders, the uncertainty with the estimates tended to increase. Logic can be summa-
rized that the proper cost estimation requires good plans and drafts for the project, and 
the quality of these is affected by the time available and the amount information needed 
from outside the company.  
7.1.2 Cost and uncertainty estimation process 
Interviewees generally understood well the link between the uncertainty and the costs. As 
one interviewee stated:   
“The most important task of uncertainty analysis is to recognize the elements caus-
ing uncertainty and therefore cost variation, and furthermore the situations and 
projects where our company is out of its core competence zone.” 
The significance of project-specific knowledge and the continuity was strongly present in 
the responses. Many interviewees emphasized the significance of cross-functional coop-
eration and knowledge transfer as significant success factor of the estimation process. 
According to one interviewee: 
“The best results [of meeting the project budget] are get when the team executing 
the project is involved already in the planning phase. Our company could increase 
its profitability by involving the project team more often in the planning phase.” 
According to several interviewees, uncertainty in estimates can be reduced by increasing 
the amount of knowledge transfer and sharing between different functions, and when pos-
sible this should be done so that the project team responsible over the project execution 
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should also participate in the estimation phase. This was also present in the process of 
cost estimation, as most of them tried to involve the project team and other internal stake-
holder functions into the planning process. 
However, this was not always the reality in the actual estimation phase. The reason for 
not involving project team into the planning process was, again, often the rush and the 
project team being involved into the project execution phase. This simply meant, that the 
time of project manager and project team was allocated to the project only when it offi-
cially started, and they were often underused in the estimation phase. According to cost 
estimation engineer:  
“Especially when there are many projects under execution, there is not enough 
participation from the project side to the estimation process. Even though our of-
ficial process states that the project managers should participate in the cost esti-
mation, it is not unseen situation where we submit a quote worth of millions with-
out project manager spending a minute with the cost estimate.” 
Apart from the cross-functional cooperation, the interviewees generally saw the estima-
tion to include skills and functionalities specific for the cost estimators. Three of the com-
panies interviewed had a separate organizational function responsible for drafting the es-
timates, and fourth was doing the cost estimations for other companies in the role of con-
sultants. Only one company had the situation where the sales was the main unit responsi-
ble for drafting the estimates, and reason for this was perhaps the high degree of diversity 
of their projects – it would have been difficult for separate estimation function to gain 
enough know-how over the project to estimate it properly. Benefits of executing the esti-
mates in a separate organizational unit were seen to be the more systematic usage of his-
torical data and systematically executed estimation process.  
Importance of including a several people to the process was emphasized. One company 
even used the amount of people who participated in the estimation process as a meter on 
how accurate the estimate could be expected to be. Apart from project function, the 
knowledge centered in sourcing, sales managers and different engineering units was val-
ued. The benefit of including multiple people in the process was that the biases of one 
person or function tended to compensate each other out. As one cost estimation engineer 
said:  
“Project managers are good people but they generally have perspective only for 
the last project they have been involved with.” 
It is also noteworthy that the length of the process varied a lot even inside the companies. 
Some indicative estimation processes took some hours or minutes, and the most rigorous 
estimation processes could involve hundreds of hours of work solely from the cost esti-
mator. People involved in the estimation also naturally increased as the desired accuracy 
increased.  
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7.1.3 Tools and methods for cost and uncertainty estimations 
Contingency as a concept was used in all of the interviewed companies, even though the 
term in use varied. For example, some firms simply referred to it as “buffer” or “cost 
reservation”. However, the methods for calculating the contingency varied greatly. Inter-
viewed companies used fairly simple methods for cost estimation. For example, Monte 
Carlo analysis or any other form of cost simulation had been used only sometimes by one 
of the interviewed companies. Table 8 summarizes these tools used in the interviewed 
companies.  
Table 8. Summary of the estimation tools in use. 
Com-
pany Method Explanation Tools 
Person 
resbonsible 
for estimate 
A 
Variation 
analysis 
-Each item was evaluated with 
three-point estimation 
-These estimates were used as a 
basis for calculating the cost dis-
tribution for the whole project 
Spread-
sheets 
Cost estimation 
engineer 
B 
Multiple esti-
mators 
-Different estimators formed their 
own estimations 
-Through discussion consensus of 
the costs was reached 
Spread-
sheets Sales 
C 
Risk map-
ping 
-Risks and opportunities were 
evaluated in the risk workshop 
-Contingency was based on the 
cost reservations made for differ-
ent risks and opportunities 
Tailored 
cost-estima-
tion  
software 
Cost estimation 
engineer 
D 
Risk map-
ping 
-Risks and opportunities were 
evaluated in the risk workshop 
-Contingency was based on the 
cost reservations made for differ-
ent risks and opportunities 
Tailored 
cost-estima-
tion  
software 
Cost estimation 
engineer 
E 
Using  
diminishing 
contingency 
-Contingency diminished when 
plans and drafts for the project 
were improved 
Spread-
sheets 
Cost estimation 
engineer 
 
Estimates were not uniform, and their accuracy varied a lot. Most of the companies inter-
viewed had a system where they drafted different kinds of estimates for different pur-
poses. Indicative estimates were used as a basis for discussions with the customers, and 
final binding estimates were used as a basis of drafting the contract. For example, for 
early phases it was often enough to do crude parametric estimate and then only for the 
binding quotes do bottom-up cost estimate based on detailed project plans. Accuracy of 
the estimates naturally increased as the estimation effort and the detail of the project plans 
they were based on increased.  
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Request for quotes were important tool for the companies whose projects included a lot 
of subcontracting from other companies. This was the most practical way for these com-
panies to get market price information and to ensure that the estimates for subcontracting 
parts are realistic. Interviewees also noted how asking estimates from multiple potential 
subcontractors increased the confidence to the estimate, especially if estimates of the sub-
contractors were close to each other. 
All of the interviewed companies used some sort of uncertainty evaluation as the part of 
the cost and uncertainty estimation process, and the interviewees understood the link be-
tween uncertainty and costs. Risk side of the uncertainty analysis was generally empha-
sized. However, at least two of the interviewed companies also actively looked for op-
portunities that could affect into project costs in the sales phase. From interviewees’ point 
of view, there was a practical reason for emphasizing risks, as one cost estimation engi-
neer put it:  
“Costs have tendency to be higher than expected rather than vice versa.” 
The way uncertainty mapping affected to the cost estimates however varied greatly. In 
the simplest form, the risks and opportunities were included into the project costs only as 
the sales manager’s personal evaluation on how much risks project hold. More systematic 
way, found in the several interviews, was to go through categorized and mapped risks 
from the previous projects and then evaluate how these could affect the costs. This eval-
uation could be just again expert’s estimate, actual cost associated with the project (for 
example contract penalty) or then analysis on the probability and cost impact of the event.  
Historical data was used to varying degree. Almost all of the companies had a data bank 
from which they could look the realized costs of similar past projects. The exception were 
the projects that were based entirely on labor. Especially in the software projects these 
can be notoriously hard to estimate (for example Brooks 1995). Interviewees who used 
historical data saw it as important tool for accessing the most likely costs and getting 
objective information that did not include human biases.  
7.1.4 Found issues and best practices 
Issue that came up in several of the interviews was the tendency of estimators to adjust 
the cost estimates from the external reasons. This could happen typically in the highly 
competitive bidding situation or when there was internal pressure to present lower costs 
for the decision makers. Even though the interviewees might not always realize it them-
selves, this meant that in these situations the cost estimation and uncertainty estimate 
failed to deliver its most important task: to give a realistic analysis on the costs associated 
with the project. Especially in the competitive situations the cost adjustment was seen as 
a normal practice among interviewees.  
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Same problems could be found from the usage of the contingency. It was common method 
to base the contingency to fixed percentage or expert’s evaluation; these methods lacked 
consistency and were therefore likely to convey false feelings of the accuracy of the esti-
mates, as discussed in Section 3.5. Furthermore, these contingencies were manipulated to 
match desired results, which meant that these calculated contingencies did not quantify 
well the project uncertainty. As a positive note, the one company that had a systematic 
way of calculating the contingency also made sure it was not manipulated; rather, this 
company adjusted the sales price and the profit estimates in highly competitive situations.  
The companies that used contingency reserves generally saw it as necessary element of 
the cost estimation. According to project consultant:  
“There are always unexpected situations in the projects and without contingencies 
the project will almost certainly exceed its budget.” 
Most of the times cost and uncertainty estimating requires a lot of assumptions, and these 
assumptions need to be documented if the organization wants to evaluate the accuracy of 
the estimate after the project has ended. According to the interviews, good documentation 
is necessary if the organization wants to learn from the estimates. In one interview organ-
izational learning was raised as an issue. According to the cost estimator: 
“The cost estimation unit is quite separated from the project unit, so the problem 
for us is to get enough information from the execution phase so that we can learn 
and improve our estimation processes.” 
The impact of the sales KPI’s to the successful estimates were also speculated in couple 
of interviews. The interviewees saw it generally to be better if the incentives of the sales 
are not only based on the amount of sales, but also the success of the projects. This would 
create an incentive for the salespeople to get realistic estimates. Problem in this model is 
that determining success of the project can take several years in some cases.   
Sufficient resources were mentioned as an important antecedent for cost and uncertainty 
estimation success. Without these and the commitment of the management, the quality of 
the estimates is lower and therefore the inaccuracies of the estimates higher. The commit-
ment and usage of time was also required from the other departments than the cost esti-
mators, as the cost estimation was seen as a team effort.  
7.2 Intervention for the case company’s estimation process 
Second intervention was to implement uncertainty estimation practices to the cost esti-
mation process. Intervention started with a look into the company’s past projects to de-
termine the nature of company’s cost overruns, as these would indicate the failures in the 
sales phase cost estimation. Data from the project profitability was available from the 
year 2009 onwards, and the sales phase documents were available with a little patience. 
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Cost overruns were visible in all the size categories, but especially striking numbers were 
met when looking into the 30 biggest delivery projects in the terms of revenue from 2009-
2017. These numbers are presented in Table 9.  
Table 9. Cost increases of the 30 biggest projects in terms of revenue of the case com-
pany 2009-2017. 
All the projects Excluding the most profitable project 
category 
Revenue decrease -1.48% Revenue decrease -1.51% 
Cost increase % 9.50% Cost increase % 19.32% 
Gross Margin slip 5.37% Gross Margin slip 11.87% 
 
The left side table includes all the 30 biggest projects. However, these projects included 
10 similar projects for the same product category which content included mainly deliver-
ing material and a small amount of work; they were all highly successful and profitable. 
These projects are excluded from the right-side table.  
As can be seen, the revenues tended to decrease and costs to increase in the projects, and 
numbers do not paint beautiful picture on the success of these bigger project deliveries. 
The costs had been estimated well below the actual level on the portfolio level, and of the 
30 biggest projects 18 had exceeded their budget. When evaluating the whole project 
portfolio in the terms of gross margin slip, the result was annually usually around 2%. 
This fact was supported with the interviews in the case company where the larger delivery 
projects were seen more problematic than the others. From this point of view, it was de-
cided that the intervention should focus on the bigger projects, as the uncertainties and 
cost overruns were more severe in this category.  
Idea generation started with participating to cost estimation process for some of the case 
company’s projects in the mid-October 2017. The idea was to evaluate different ideas on 
how the cost estimation team could evaluate uncertainty in the cost estimation phase and 
communicate uncertainties affecting to the cost estimation across functional boundaries. 
Ideas were based on the interviews both externally and internally, as well as to the existing 
methodologies from the project management literature. The ideas at this stage are pre-
sented in Table 10.  
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Table 10. Ideas for uncertainty estimation. 
Idea  
 
Explanation Recognized issues 
with the method 
Support-
ing facts 
Source for 
the idea 
Weighted  
average 
-Estimating three-point 
estimates (best case, 
most likely case, worst 
case) for the cost items 
-Calculating weighted av-
erage 
-Risk of estimating too 
low contingency 
-Easy to 
understand 
PERT-meth-
odology (PMI 
2008) 
Probabil-
ity distri-
butions 
-Estimating three-point 
estimates (best case, 
most likely case, worst 
case) for the cost items 
-Calculating probability 
distribution of the whole 
project based on these 
three values 
-Difficulty to under-
stand the concept of 
"probability distribu-
tion" 
-Relatively 
easy to un-
derstand 
-External in-
terview 
Monte 
Carlo 
analysis 
-Estimating distributions 
for different cost items 
-Simulating the project to 
calculate probability dis-
tribution for the entire 
project 
-Difficult to use and 
understand for sales 
and project managers 
-Most accu-
rate 
method for 
the estima-
tion 
-PMI 2008, 
external inter-
view 
Correla-
tion 
-As above, but in addition 
estimating correlation be-
tween cost items 
-Difficulties to establish 
meaningful correla-
tions 
-Difficulties to under-
stand the concept of 
"correlation" for sales 
and project managers 
-Would im-
prove the 
model 
-PMI 2008 
Cost item 
contin-
gency 
-Adding contingency for 
the riskiest cost elements 
-Difficult to document 
the usage 
-Current 
practice in 
the case 
company 
-Existing 
practice in 
the case 
company 
Risk and 
opportu-
nities re-
view 
-Going through uncer-
tainties and assessing a 
cost and probability for 
them 
-Difficulty to under-
stand and estimate 
"probability" for risks 
-Addresses 
the uncer-
tainties that 
are not visi-
ble 
-Interview 
with one of 
the project 
managers, 
External in-
terviews 
Historical 
data 
-Using historical data to 
assess uncertainty for 
the project components 
-Difficulty generalizing 
results for the future 
projects 
-Produces 
quantifiable 
facts 
-Interview 
with the deci-
sion makers 
of the case 
company 
Project 
categori-
zation 
-Categorizing the pro-
jects and assessing the 
risks based on its attrib-
utes 
-Difficulty of generaliz-
ing the categorization 
-Does not support de-
cision making  
-Easy to 
use 
-Interview 
with the deci-
sion makers 
of the case 
company 
 
The goal of the intervention was to produce a model for quantifying contingency for the 
projects that would correlate with the amount of uncertainty the project has. This model 
and concept of contingency as such would then act as a means to gather the known facts 
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and risks from different project stakeholders and work as a boundary object through 
which the uncertainty could be discussed. Advantage of contingency was that it was quan-
tified, concrete number that provided information for the decision-making purposes. Fig-
ure 23 summarizes the goal of the intervention and the positioning of the ideas from the 
perspective of the framework of this thesis. 
 
Figure 23. Positioning of the ideas to the thesis framework. 
As can be seen from the figure above, first four of these ideas were more focused on 
recognizing variation from the estimated cost items. All of these four first ideas use three-
point estimation as a source for data, which is a method of estimating three scenarios (best 
case, most likely case and worst case) for each of the cost items. However, complexity of 
these methods varies, simplest method being weighted average calculation and most com-
plex Monte Carlo simulation with correlation. Last four ideas can be more associated with 
recognizing foreseeable uncertainties from the project environment.  
Ideas were tested with sales and project managers to understand how they understood the 
tools. The cost estimation work in the case company for larger deliveries was done with 
MS Excel, so mock-ups for the ideas were developed in spreadsheet form in order to test 
the ideas and their suitability for cost estimation purposes. Testing itself was then session 
with the project or sales manager, where these mock-ups were used to estimate the un-
certainty of the project.  
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When starting to test the tools, there were several criteria for the further selection and 
elaboration of the concepts: 
1. Concept should help to recognize uncertainty in the project under estima-
tion 
2. Concept should be possible for the sales and project managers and other 
stakeholders to use and understand 
3. Concept should allow justifiable quantification of contingency 
4. Concept should enhance understanding and communication across organi-
zational boundaries 
Firstly, the cost of overruns could have been addressed by estimating equal contingency 
for all the projects, which would cover all the cost overruns. This would have effectively 
covered the costs, but this would not have given any supporting information for the deci-
sion making or helped to mitigate the effects of uncertainty for the specific project. Fur-
thermore, case company had competition, so simply trying to put more costs and price on 
all the projects was not an option. This was the reason to aim for the concept that would 
help to recognize risks in the specific delivery project, as this would then allow the deci-
sion makers to mitigate the risks, exploit opportunities or to decide that the whole project 
is too risky for execution to begin with.  
Secondly, the purpose of the tool was to support the work, collaboration and understand-
ing of uncertainty while different organizational functions estimated the project costs. 
Therefore, ability to understand and use the concept was therefore important, as “black 
box” models for decision making could be dangerous for educated decision making in the 
long run. This criterion is of course highly subjective, as the stakeholders could be edu-
cated to understand more complex frameworks over time. In the context of this thesis, 
models that most of the interviewees could not grasp and understood during one-hour 
one-on-one session were deemed too complex, as there was less resources to be used for 
the actual implementation of the concept.   
Thirdly, while the usability was important, the model should still be somehow justifiable 
and be based on facts, not just in the gut feelings. This was somewhat contradicting cri-
teria with the second one, as any model building usually requires generalizations and ab-
stractions (Hofstadter 1979). For the understandability and usability, crude generaliza-
tions were necessary, yet at the same time it was important that the complex reality was 
not simplified too much for the sake of simplicity.   
Finally, the concept should increase cross-functional communication and aid decision 
making. Therefore, it was not enough that some model automatically produces result for 
the contingency – stakeholders and especially sales and project managers should closely 
participate to the uncertainty estimation. This arose from the simple fact that the sales 
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managers of the case company hold the information about the customer needs and reali-
ties, while the project managers were irreplaceable in their knowledge over actual deliv-
eries and company’s products. 
7.2.1 Variance analysis as intervention 
All the possibilities for estimating variation included doing three-point estimations, 
though the complexity varied significantly. The problem therefore was to select a method 
that had a right degree of both explanations ability and simplicity present. Monte Carlo 
analysis was also tested for the project cost calculation as a means to assign uncertainty. 
Difficulty here was that the concept was not simple enough for the stakeholders to under-
stand, and hence the results did not really support decision making. Same was true for 
using correlations: attempts to include it in calculations made the whole estimation pro-
cess too complex from the point of view of the sales and project managers. However, 
throughout the process of developing the ideas for intervention Monte Carlo was used to 
verify the approximations and to evaluate the risks of the projects independently from the 
sales and project managers.  
The most promising ideas after different variations of simulation methods were the using 
weighted average and probability distribution, former for the simpler projects and latter 
for the large projects. The selected methods are illustrated in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24. Selected ideas for estimating variation. 
Before explaining the math, it is important to underline that the main point of the inter-
vention was to increase communication through three-point estimation. This thesis does 
not aim to develop new methods for the risk calculation or approximation. From the math-
ematical point of view, there is a lot of potential for improvement in the methods. This is 
however true in any algorithm or abstraction; they rarely correspond to the complex real-
ity. Aim was simply to cause the contingency to correspond the amount of variance sales 
managers and project managers expressed in their estimations; if they were sure of their 
estimates, different scenarios would be close together. However, when the estimates were 
pure guesses, the method would result in increased variance and increase the contingency 
for the project. 
Process started by project stakeholders estimating three different cost scenarios for cost 
items: best, most likely and worst values. Best and worst represent values that stakehold-
ers think the cost item might be if the worst risks or best opportunities realize, but with 
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the restriction that the scope of the project remains unchanged. “Most likely” is also gen-
erally intuitively understood term, and corresponds with the concept of mode from the 
statistics: the value that is most common in the dataset (Gujarati & Porter 1999). From 
these estimates the weighted average was then calculated, which for the decision making 
provided better estimate that corresponded to the average scenario of the cost items. This 
is illustrated in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25. Example on three-point estimation. 
The contingency that this estimation produced was then calculated by diminishing the 
sum of most likely values from the sum of weighted averages. Reasoning was, that the 
most likely values were the target values for each individual cost item. However, the 
weighted average was likely to be closer to the actual expenses on the project level.  
Weighted average was enough for simpler and smaller projects where the efficiency and 
understandability of the uncertainty estimation were the main goal. Weighted average as 
a method was also very straightforward to explain, and therefore its usage was easy to 
sell for project and sales managers. However, for the more complex and large projects 
more complex version of this uncertainty estimation was developed which included eval-
uating the probability distributions of the different cost items. Even though weighted av-
erage already forced the stakeholders consider uncertainty related to different cost items, 
it was possible to end up with the calculation where different scenarios are far away from 
each other, but the contingency is still zero because worst and best case scenarios out-
weigh each other. To prevent this, evaluation of probability distributions was necessary.  
For this, standard deviations and variances were calculated for the cost items, assuming 
them to be normally distributed. Based on these, distribution of the project’s total costs 
could be calculated. From these values the probability of meeting the project budget can 
then be calculated with the cumulative distribution. This is illustrated in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26. Estimating cost variation with approximated probability distributions. 
When using probability distributions, contingency was the amount of how much the pro-
ject costs on selected desired probability of meeting project budget were higher than with 
just calculating the sum of most likely values. For example, typical desired probability 
for meeting the project budget was often 70%. This meant that there was 70% change of 
project costs being lower than the selected cost, and 30% change of the project costs 
exceeding the budget. Sum of most likely values was then extracted from this budget to 
calculate the contingency in the project budget.  
Challenge when creating the method was to select desired level of accuracy for the cost 
items; if the three-point-estimation was used for all the smallest cost items in the project, 
this could result into hundreds of items that need to be estimated. However, spending time 
to analyze the cost variance of every single bolt and screw did not seem time well spent. 
Therefore, it was necessary to categorize the cost elements into meaningful categories 
that could be estimated in a meaningful way.  
The advantage of this method was that it was easy to explain, as the 50% probability 
corresponds to the weighted average of the cost items, which as a concept was simple to 
understand. For smaller projects in the terms of revenue under intervention this 50% was 
enough; although method did not often produce significant contingency for these smaller 
projects, the simple act of estimating variance made estimate more accurate and reduced 
bias in the estimate. Because the model included also the means to assign higher proba-
bilities, for strategical projects or projects in the bigger revenue category higher proba-
bility and higher contingency could be used. 
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7.2.2 Risk and opportunities review as intervention 
Variation analysis could be used to estimate only the uncertainties that were visible in the 
cost estimation in the form of cost items. Therefore, cost overrun risks related to for ex-
ample contractual penalties or into relationships with the customer could not be estimated 
simply by the means of cost estimation. Recognizing the potential cost implications of 
these foreseeable uncertainties required another method for estimation.  
The idea for using of historical data as means to calculate contingency was scrapped. It 
did not enhance communication and it was impossible to apply historical information for 
specific projects, as representative and trustworthy data for project components was hard 
to obtain from the data sources of the company. Last but not least, types of the projects 
the company undertook had changed from the past, both in the terms of products and 
revenue, so over-confidence on quantifying risk from the past data had a risk of being 
counter-productive.  
For the same reason, idea of basing the contingency calculation on categorization of the 
projects by their risk elements proved to be unsuccessful. While there was elements in 
the projects that generally meant increased risk and uncertainties, like for example size 
of the projects, amount of stakeholders and subcontracting and the type of the product, 
there was always exceptions whether these realized as cost-overruns. Furthermore, case 
company had tried categorizing projects in the past and the experiences from it were that 
it had been tool that had had little effect on actual project governance or pricing.  
Many sales managers used system in the company where they assigned contingency for 
the cost items they saw risky, for example on the subcontracting in the cases where the 
company did not yet have binding deal with the subcontractor. This was tested as a tool 
to assign contingency for the items; however, the documentation of this practice became 
difficult, as it was under a dispute how much contingency should be assigned for certain 
items. Furthermore, in the cases where sales managers or project managers assigned con-
tingencies for most of the project items, this created a lot of vagueness on the item costs 
and increased the contingency to the unacceptable level.  
Therefore, second tool for the intervention was to compile a risk register from the past 
projects, that could be used as a basis for discussions between project stakeholders. Actual 
intervention for the company was to teach to sales and project managers how this register 
could be used to recognize risks and opportunities from the project environment. The 
selected idea is highlighted in Figure 27.  
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Figure 27. Selected idea for estimating foreseeable uncertainties. 
Currently the case company had a risk review process; however, the aim was to answer 
whether the risk was unacceptable, not to the question on the financial implications on 
the risk. Furthermore, the company lacked the formal process of reviewing possible risks 
systematically before the quotation phase.  
In addition discussing about the risk and mitigation actions, in the risk and opportunities 
review project stakeholders’ purpose was to also discuss the financial implications of the 
risks by assigning probabilities and costs for the risks. Contingency would then simply 
be the multiplication of probability and cost, and overall project level sum of all these 
individual contingencies calculated for different uncertainties. Register also contained 
typical mitigation actions that were suitable for the risks. This register is illustrated in 
Table 11.  
Table 11. Example on risk review. 
 
Challenge with this was that people understand probability in a different way, and differ-
ent stakeholders have different opinions on how much risk can be mitigated. Therefore, 
it is crucial to understand that the contingency here is the expert evaluation on how much 
contingency should be used for specific risk. This means that different parties agree about 
the size of the contingency, and often the number can be questioned. However, going 
through the risks documents the viewpoint and the current understanding on their sever-
ity, which improves the situation over ignoring all the financial implications of the risks 
and opportunities.  
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7.2.3 Putting pieces together 
The presented pieces of intervention were both components of contingency that was then 
added to the cost estimate of the project and treated as a part of project costs. Goal of the 
variance analysis was to recognize the uncertainty from different cost components of the 
project. In contrast, risk review process was specifically aimed for recognizing foreseea-
ble uncertainties that could be recognized from the project environment by different pro-
ject stakeholders. This is illustrated in Figure 28.  
 
Figure 28. Elements of contingency. 
As can be seen, the intervention did not take into account unforeseen uncertainties. This 
was mainly because the unforeseen uncertainties are something that cannot by definition 
be countered with deterministic methods. Therefore, their mitigation was mainly possible 
only in the project execution phase with the actions of project manager. However, the 
amount of contingency was recommended to be rounded up as it was common knowledge 
that not all the uncertainties can be estimated.  
Contingency that was calculated did not disappear anywhere at the end of the sales pro-
cess. It remained in the sales phase documentation and was stored to the company’s ERP 
system to be used for lessons learnt exercises in the future and to be critically evaluated 
whether contingency had been sufficient on portfolio level. Unfortunately, none of the 
projects whose contingency was researched during the intervention did not end, so any 
data from the calculated contingencies correspondence with the reality was not collected 
during this research.  
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Literature also recognizes the possibility or even encourages to analyze contingency dur-
ing different stages of the project (Lorance 1992). This would then communicate the de-
velopment of uncertainty during project execution phase. In this intervention this was not 
incorporated as a part of forecasting activities for project managers, mainly because ad-
ministrative work was already seen too high among the project managers and because the 
risk analysis from the cost perspective was not seen as a tool supporting decision making 
after the sales had been made. However, implementing contingency evaluation in the dif-
ferent life stages of the project remains possibility in the case company especially for 
critical and strategic projects.  
7.2.4 Implementation of the method 
The concepts developed in cooperation with the sales and projects were also implemented 
to the usage. Hence, during January – February 2018, the implementation of the uncer-
tainty estimation process took place for the cost estimation process. The implementation 
consisted of following elements: 
1. Modifying case company’s project cost estimation spreadsheets so that they used 
variation analysis and had a risk and opportunities register 
2. Presenting the idea for the company’s regional heads and other key decision mak-
ers 
3. Testing and selling the method by participating to 1-3 test cases in each region 
4. 5 separate training sessions for case company’s project managers from different 
regions 
5. Documenting the usage and instructions for the tools and sharing them with the 
case company 
Firstly, the case company’s tools, especially spreadsheets, were modified so that they 
included the idea of variation analysis and risk and opportunities review. Case company’s 
“project cost calculation tool” had an established structure for different cost items that 
were to be evaluated for project cost calculation. This was modified so that the tool in-
cluded different cost scenarios (best, most likely, worst) by default. In addition, past risks 
were added on the separate sheet to be used as a basis for the risk and opportunity reviews 
between sales and project managers in the future. For larger projects a modified version 
of these was developed, as there was more need for ad-hoc estimates and a need for the 
estimator to decide themselves the adequate level of accuracy in the estimate. Further-
more, for these larger projects the concept of probability distributions was included.  
Secondly, the idea was presented for the case company’s key decision makers to gather 
feedback and to sell the concept for them. Issue that the key decision makers had was the 
math behind the model, which confused some of them. They argued, that simpler models 
were better and more time efficient to use. This feedback was taken into account so, that 
the especially for the main bulk of projects that were estimated in the case company 
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weighted average method was recommended, and the more sophisticated estimation with 
probability distributions was reserved for the larger project deliveries.  
Thirdly, the concept was tested again with projects from different regions. Reasons for 
these tests were to both gather feedback and through familiarizing the concept for the 
sales managers, project managers and decision makers to sell the idea and its benefits. 
These tests were necessary to ease the internal struggle between project and sales func-
tions about the estimation and especially to alleviate the suspicion of some of the decision 
makers towards the method. After the tests, the decision makers were receptive towards 
the concept as they had seen the methods in use and had a change to give feedback.  
Fourthly, five training sessions were organized for the company’s project managers in 
different regions to teach the usage of the method. One of the interesting things countered 
in this phase was the difficulty of some project managers to understand the concept of 
“scenarios”. This was true especially for the project managers from outside Europe, as 
they were expecting some strict guidelines on what the “best” or “worst” scenarios should 
be. The idea that they were free to estimate these based on the project characteristics 
seemed alien to them. There are many plausible explanations for this behavior. Maybe 
the projects that these managers undertook were more “standard”, i.e., they had less var-
iation. Other possible explanation that crossed researcher’s mind is cultural differences. 
There were of course differences also among Finnish project managers on their ability to 
analytically estimate different scenarios or even the project themselves based on the avail-
able data and experience these project managers had. However, these differences were 
especially underlined when training project managers from different regions and cultures.  
Finally, instructions of the methods were written and shared with the case company. Un-
fortunately, the training for the sales managers was rather thin and limited to different 
practical tests that were undertaken with sales. Case company’s project function had in-
tention to slowly implement the concepts to the practice through project managers who 
used the concept. If the concept proved to be successful also in longer practice, the sales 
managers who were especially focused on the project sales could then be trained for the 
concepts at some point in the future.  
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8. DISCUSSION AND LESSONS LEARNED 
8.1 Results of the intervention for company processes 
Sales function saw that the contingency was something that was increasing the sales price, 
and this was often their feedback on the concept and basis of their reluctance to adopt the 
concept. However, contingency as a concept is not linked to the sales price; it is linked to 
the cost of implementing the project, and contingency should be treated as a separate 
concept from the sales price. This was not understood by everyone in the beginning of 
the intervention. This was true also in the project management where contingency was 
seen as a magical tool that would make project automatically more profitable. Figure 29 
illustrates this point.  
 
Figure 29. Effect of contingency into the Sales price and Gross Margin. 
As Figure 29 illustrates, in these kinds of projects where the supplier company is calcu-
lating contingency for tender purposes, whether or not to include the contingency into the 
sales price is a business decision and this decision should not affect the size of the con-
tingency in any way. However, attitude to manipulate contingency according to the busi-
ness situation was often present in different discussions. When thinking further, idea that 
risks somehow disappear or opportunities appear according to how many competing sup-
pliers there is or how much money the customer is willing to pay is clearly absurd. It 
remains vague to which degree these encountered bias were deliberate attempt to get 
managerial approval for the project and to which degree simply misunderstanding of the 
contingency as a concept.  
Second objection especially from the sales function was that the project execution was 
already taking too many resources; therefore, contingency would allow them to be more 
inefficient. This argument might be true to some extent; like Baccarini (2005) notes, the 
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contingency which is too high might cause sloppy project management. This is not how-
ever sufficient argument to claim that no uncertainties and contingencies exist in the pro-
ject environment and to create unrealism in the cost estimations.  
Third counter-argument for the method is related to the position of the researcher in the 
case company. This intervention was executed for the project management function, 
which caused the issue of some sales managers seeing this as the project management’s 
unnecessary attempt to disturb and control the sales process. In short, the researcher fell 
initially to victim of not-invented-here syndrome, which is the negative attitude of re-
spondents towards knowledge that was externally invented (Antons & Piller 2015). 
Therefore, even though it was generally acknowledged that the knowledge sharing is im-
portant for the successful cost estimation, at the same time sales function felt strong own-
ership of the sales process and felt that the sales manager should be responsible of crafting 
all the estimates. 
As a result of the intervention, the emphasis for risk management and communication of 
the risks moved from the project planning phase to the quotation preparation phase. In 
the sales phase it had been necessary to “understand the risks” before the intervention. 
This was done by categorizing risk on very high level and then sales manager’s respon-
sibility was to mark that they had gone through the risks and contact and review the risks 
with other stakeholders if necessary. However, what this meant in practice varied a lot: 
in some cases, it might mean rigorous risk review session, in other cases simply sales 
manager’s personal judgement that the risks were under control. Typically risk manage-
ment plan was then executed at the start of the project; the result of intervention was to 
systematically start this management of the risks already in the sales phase. This is illus-
trated in Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30. Shifting the emphasis of uncertainty analysis to the sales process. 
Risk review and variance analysis acted as the boundary objects between key organiza-
tional functions, projects and sales. Intervention did not change the way these functions 
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internally analyzed uncertainty as analysis and as feelings. Sales function preserved its 
inherent optimism, and project management kept its pessimism about the project perfor-
mance. However, the intervention enabled these functions to communicate these feelings 
and their analyses. It is also worth to note that the longitudinal aspect of this study was 
quite limited, and therefore it would have been interesting to see the long-term effects of 
the intervention to see whether the attitudes towards the uncertainty would change per-
manently. Updates to the company’s objects and ends framework are presented in Figure 
31.  
 
Figure 31. Knowledge boundaries and uncertainty management in the case company. 
Contingency acted as a boundary object between projects, sales and decision maker on 
whether to pursue the project or not and what actions should be taken in the form of 
uncertainty management. Previously, uncertainty was managed in many boundary-object-
in-use, while after the intervention boundary objects for uncertainty management were 
designated boundary objects, following the taxonomy of Levina and Vaast (2005). Com-
municating uncertainty in the forms of risk review and variance analysis enabled more 
complete picture on the issue. Risks had been discussed before in the decision-making 
process, but usually the focus was on the most evident risks rather than reviewing the risk 
portfolio as a whole.  
Contingency also crystallized for the decision makers the linkage of uncertainty to the 
profitability. Previously its analysis had not been done in a clear manner when reviewing 
quote: uncertainties were discussed from the viewpoint whether risks were acceptable, 
but the analysis on whether the gross margin is good enough if some risks realized was 
omitted.  
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Variance analysis allowed to include the potential changes in material costs and therefore 
product prices, which was omitted as well in the previous process. Previously, when the 
material prices changed, they were updated to the company’s ERP system. The possibility 
of them changing was not taken into account during the sales process, even though it 
might take years from the quotation until the project would start. To make things worse, 
the product managers did not seem to communicate these changes much outside the for-
mal ERP process. Variation analysis allowed the project cost estimation team to also in-
clude these changes into the analysis, and potentially to even inquire from product man-
agers whether they should expect significant increases on product prices in the upcoming 
years.  
Situation towards customer remained unchanged; the sales function was the main link 
towards the customer during the cost estimation phase and therefore had the best 
knowledge of the customer needs. Contingency was not communicated towards the cus-
tomer, as they also were not aware of the internal cost structure of case company’s prod-
ucts and labor. 
8.2 Results of the intervention compared to framework 
After presenting the results of the intervention, it is now possible to evaluate the interven-
tion against the framework presented in Section 5.3. This intervention considered uncer-
tainty analysis as boundary object, through which different organizational functions can 
communicate to overcome organizational boundaries. This framework and intervention’s 
position in it is presented in Figure 32. 
 
Figure 32. Intervention compared to framework. 
Framework can seen from the viewpoint of Carlile’s (2002) knowledge boundaries of 
syntax, semantic and practical boundaries. Contingency creates a syntax through which 
different project stakeholders can communicate their views on uncertainty, both analyti-
cal and their feelings about the uncertainty. In turn, each actor’s subjective topoi can be 
seen to contain what Carlile (2002) mentions as pragmatic knowledge boundary: motiva-
tional and political boundaries. In turn, semantical boundaries are present when different 
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actors and organizational functions communicate their viewpoint on uncertainty. These 
semantic and pragmatic boundaries can then be overcome with the help of contingency 
and the syntax it creates.  
Classification of variation and foreseen uncertainties proved very useful and the parts of 
the intervention, variation analysis and risk and opportunities review, were built to corre-
spond into these types of uncertainty. Uncertainty analysis does not analyze project envi-
ronment as it is, but the information from it goes through different project functions where 
it is assessed through their subjective topoi: objects that they use to analyze uncertainty, 
and their ends and feelings they have towards project uncertainty. This then conceptual-
izes function’s perception on uncertainty, which is then communicated through the des-
ignated boundary objects.  
This analysis constructs the shared perception of uncertainty, or organizational topoi, as 
different stakeholders’ perceptions are communicated and constructed through boundary 
object of uncertainty analysis. Even though internal perceptions on uncertainty of differ-
ent functions do not change completely during the process, this shared perception docu-
ments how different parties see uncertainty. Contingency as a concept proved to be very 
efficient way of doing this, as it is quantifiable number and puts a price on the risk, which 
makes the business impacts of uncertainty visible.   
Finally, this shared perception on uncertainty can influence over time the internal percep-
tions of different functions and cause organizational learning. For example, if the analysis 
and communication lead to the conclusion that there are significant risks for example 
regarding subcontracting, this might cause different participants to evaluate subcontract-
ing costs and uncertainties more critically in the other projects as well.  
Uncertainty as a boundary object offers a clear look on how different organizational func-
tions can use boundary object to facilitate conversation and make sense of the uncertain 
project environment. None of the actors know complete picture of the project environ-
ment alone, and most of them have some sort of biases in their perceptions of uncertainty; 
truth is probably to be found somewhere between different extremes. Boundary object 
enabled this conversation.  
Furthermore, boundary object also gathered known facts about the uncertainty. Without 
it the pieces of information could maybe have been found from the quotes, contracts and 
other relevant project artefacts. While using these boundary-objects–in-use was often 
enough to pinpoint major flaws and risk, they were not enough to support decision making 
about the uncertainty as a whole. Contingency as a boundary object offered clearly com-
municated analysis available on the uncertainty.  
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8.3 Reaching the objective of the thesis 
In the introduction it was highlighted how there is a gap between theoretical and practical 
sides of project uncertainty management. To narrow this gap, the goal of this thesis was 
to investigate, how organizations estimate, make sense and communicate uncertainty and 
its costs in the project sales phase. To support this goal, three sub-goals were determined. 
Interviews and interventions that were conducted offered insights into this topic. 
8.3.1 Analyzing uncertainty 
To root the research into the optimization school of project management, the first sup-
portive goal was to map the ways and methods actually in use for performing uncertainty 
analysis. Therefore, the objective was to find out what kind of tools are used to estimate 
uncertainty in Finnish project-based industries. 
It is worth to note immediately in the beginning that the sample used to answer to this 
objective was inadequately small – 6 Finnish project-based companies in total, one of 
which was analyzed thoroughly as a case company. That said, in-depth interviews and 
case study analysis provided more concrete and deep insights about the practices of these 
companies than for example a questionnaire would have had.  
The first and surprising finding for the researcher was to realize the absence of uncertainty 
estimation tools in the case company itself. Sure, everyone who dealt with the projects 
understood the fact that there was uncertainty in the project environment, but either they 
did not use any systematic measures to deal with uncertainty or then they had their indi-
vidual practices to respond to this uncertainty. Organization therefore lacked systematic 
way of analyzing uncertainty in the sales phase.  
More importantly, the inability to link uncertainty to costs was other takeaway from the 
original “tools” that were at place in the case company. Practices that were sometimes 
used at the case company, like high-level risk review or risk mapping, did not bother to 
ask, “how much can this risk portfolio cost to us?”. This is understandable from the view-
point that these tools were often utilized only after the project had already been sold, after 
which the goal was of course to deliver the project with the lowest possible overall cost.  
Findings from externally interviewed companies can be summarized as follows: 
• Contingency was often used concept, but not always properly understood 
• Communication and multiple estimators was emphasized as a key component to 
successful estimation 
• Used tools were fairly simple 
• There was emphasis on expert judgement 
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Firstly, externally interviewed companies all had the concept of contingency at place, but 
it can be argued based on these interviews that in these companies either the link between 
uncertainty and the costs was not systematic or clear. Some of these companies admitted, 
that they manipulated the contingency based on the “competitive situation”. This of 
course lets the contingency have its task as a buffer, but it is not anymore an analysis of 
the uncertain environment or expectations like Venkataraman & Pinto (2011) or Bacca-
rini (2006) argues contingency should be. Uncertainty does not magically disappear when 
there’s more competition in the market.  
Secondly, communication and use of multiple estimators was often emphasized. This 
makes sense from the point of view of the framework of this thesis: since every function 
and individual has their limited view on the external project environment, the estimation 
model that relies on only one individual is doomed to be biased towards the analysis and 
feelings of this estimating function. Through communication these viewpoints and feel-
ings they can be brought closer together and more realistic (but not always unbiased) cost 
estimate can be formed. This is also probably an explanation why for example practices 
like alliance model are becoming more common in the projects where multiple stakehold-
ers are included; it might not be enough to communicate internally for the best estimates.  
Thirdly, the tools in use were fairly simple in most of the external companies interviewed. 
Simulation models or different types of algorithms were not widely used in these compa-
nies. Considering the wide variation of different approaches to estimate and optimize the 
projects that are available in the literature, this seems to support Söderlund and Maylor’s 
(2012) conclusion of the research gap between hard and soft sides of project management 
literature. It seems at the light of this thesis that the project organizations need more 
knowledge of the effects and support for actually implementing different estimation 
methods that literature suggests.  
Finally, as a result of fairly simple methods there was emphasis on expert judgement. 
Statistics of the past projects were incorporated into the cost estimation system, but for 
other information and especially for the contingency expert judgement was often the basis 
of estimate. Reason for this according to the interviews seemed to be the “uniqueness” of 
projects and the environment, from which only the human mind is best to make estima-
tions and assumptions. However, the growing evidence suggests that in many estimation 
and forecasting situations simple algorithms often win human estimators in accuracy 
(Meehl 1986). Project management literature still seems to lack researches that would 
compare the human ability and algorithms ability to estimate project costs and uncertain-
ties, or in which the algorithms and human’s capabilities are combined. Considering the 
hype around artificial intelligence and machine learning, there seems to be a dire need for 
this kind of research.  
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8.3.2 Impacts of the intervention 
The second supportive objective aimed critically observe, what are the implications that 
the intervention caused were in the case company. Therefore, the aim was to observe, 
what impacts the implementation of uncertainty management tools has for a case com-
pany that does not have previous experience about estimating uncertainty. 
Thorough the whole thesis and especially during the intervention there was a very pro-
found conflict between projects and sales present, which can be traced to the inherent 
optimism of the sales function and inherent pessimism of the project function that was 
observed in the case company. This conflict meant that during the intervention the main 
“adversary” for the proposed methods was the sales function and the main “champion” 
for them was the project function.  
All the functions had previously thought about uncertainty and did the best they could 
individually, but the organization lacked the formal definition for “uncertainty”. As 
Slovic (1987) stated, the definition of risk is not something objective that is out there in 
the real world; therefore without a common language these organizations also lacked 
means of discussing about the uncertainty. Boundary object solved this problem and con-
tingency acted as a tool through which different factions could communicate their view 
on the uncertainty. It acted as a common syntax between the functions and demonstrated 
for the organization that there is a link between uncertainty and project costs.  
Contingency as a concept for the first time allowed the organization to start to collect data 
about the “buffer” included in the projects. Previously there had been contingency-like 
elements in the project budgets, but they were not documented. This meant that after the 
project start no-one in the case company could tell the assumptions that had been used for 
calculating price for some elements or if the probable cost overruns were taken into ac-
count. This allows the organization to critically evaluate the calculation method of con-
tingency in the future, as the calculation method can be easily changed even if the con-
tingency as a concept remains.  
Contingency as a concept forces the organization to take the uncertainty into account 
already in the sales phase; without this concept it was easy for the organization to com-
pletely ignore the analysis of uncertainty for the projects. There is still risk that the con-
tingency is manipulated or that it is calculated in a wrong way in the organization, but at 
least it is now acknowledged in the organization that the projects have uncertainties, and 
that the uncertainty has cost effects that already require attention in the sales phase.  
However, biases or the subjective topois of the different functions did not disappear. This 
also meant that conflicts between different viewpoints remained. This is not necessarily 
a problem, as the whole idea of the framework is to facilitate communication and integra-
tion. However, it is necessary to acknowledge that sometimes simple boundary object or 
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concept is not enough to solve communication problems, and if the conflicts really lead 
into biases in decision making the communication and interaction needs to be facilitated 
also through other means than through the boundary object.   
Long-term effects of the intervention are still missing from this thesis. At the time of 
writing this the implementation of the method continued for different regions; there also 
seemed to be interest from smaller system business side to familiarize itself with the con-
cept to deal with the uncertainty in the project environment. It would be interesting exer-
cise from both personal viewpoint of the research as well as from a point of view of this 
thesis to visit the case company in a couple of years to see what developments the concept 
takes after the intervention.  
8.3.3 Enhancing common understanding 
Third supportive objective was more rooted into the behaviorist school of project man-
agement research. The aim was to tie the results of the uncertainty analysis to what was 
happening in the project organization by figuring out and observing how uncertainty es-
timation tools can enhance understanding and communication about project uncertainty. 
This question was answered through the framework of boundary object and more pre-
cisely through the framework in Figure 32. Uncertainty analysis acted as a tool that al-
lowed different functions to construct their views on foreseeable uncertainties into ac-
tionable analysis. Through this analysis different functions could construct more shared 
perception about the project uncertainties.  
This case example has shown concretely how necessary it is to integrate different actors’ 
subjective perspectives, topoi, to gather together facts and to support decision making 
about project uncertainty. Without defining the elements of uncertainty and analyzing the 
most crucial aspects of it, it is impossible to manage uncertainty. Furthermore, if different 
actors continue to operate with their own perspectives on uncertainty, the actions of the 
organization are not aligned. In practice this might mean for example situation where 
sales function is giving considerable discounts to the sales price because they believe 
gross margin to be safe, and at the same time project function is estimating costs too high 
because they see considerable risks in the project execution.  
On more general level, framework in Figure 32 can be applied to Norreklit et al. (2006) 
work on subjective realism. If framework is taken out of the context of project uncertainty 
analysis, it is also valid in describing how different actor’s subjective topois are integrated 
to organizational topoi through the usage of boundary object, which gathers together dif-
ferent foreseeable facts. This is illustrated in Figure 33.  
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Figure 33. Building organizational understanding. 
This is in line with Laine et al. (2016) findings where the concept of boundary objects 
was applied to product development. This case study shows that the similar fact construct-
ing is necessary also when analyzing project uncertainty. Contingency offers a syntax and 
allows the view on uncertainty to be translated into monetary terms. Furthermore, the 
clear linkage to different types of uncertainty – variation, foreseeable and unforeseeable 
uncertainty – is key finding of this study. 
Boundary objects are valuable tools in enabling communication, but from the analytical 
perspective they also have their limitations. Communication through boundary objects 
remains subjective and can only take into account the facts and subjective topois of dif-
ferent actors who participate into the process. Therefore, this thesis does not claim that 
groups of experts estimating the project costs are the superior method for cost estimation 
because it is very likely that this is not always the case (for example Meehl 1986, Kahne-
man 2011). However, communication of the different viewpoints and common syntax 
seems to enhance understanding of the project uncertainty, even though if the superior 
estimation method for different remains to be proven.  
It can be argued that this fact constructing through communication in project management 
is valuable in itself. In many other occasions when humans are engaged in the estimation 
or prediction activities, they do not have any more control over the results. This is the 
case for example when investment bankers forecast future stock prices; they do not con-
trol the results. However, in project business, the project manager and the organization is 
responsible for the execution of the project during the execution and is therefore in the 
position of affecting the cost. While it is certainly possible to improve the forecasts with 
statistics, data and algorithms, this research also seems to point out that the understanding 
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of the project environment is valuable information for project and sales also for project 
management and execution purposes. 
This causes the need to balance between practicality and the quality of the analysis. For 
all the parties to understand the results and for the analysis to successfully convey infor-
mation, result needs to be understandable for all the participants. Unfortunately, this also 
can mean that it is necessary to sacrifice complexities and details of the analysis, like 
happened in this case. Researcher in this case would have loved to analyze uncertainty 
through Monte Carlo analysis and take into account correlation, but unfortunately this 
would not had increased the understanding of the sales managers and project function if 
they do not understand the analysis.  
Therefore, one goal of the uncertainty estimation process can be defined as transforming 
unforeseeable uncertainty to foreseeable uncertainty. While the fact remains that every-
thing in the project environment can not be analyzed it is also true that if the uncertainty 
is analyzed sloppily then more facts will remain unforeseen for the organization. This 
process requires that project managers and the organization have better understanding of 
the uncertainty after the analysis. Good communication and usage of different functions’ 
strengths minimizes the amount of facts that remain unforeseen during the cost estimation 
process.  
This thesis offered a concrete example on how different types of uncertainty recognized 
by De Meyer et al. (2002) and Van de Heijden (2011) can be analyzed from the project 
environment. While literature for project environment offers myriad ways to perform un-
certainty analysis from risk mapping to neural networks, literature rarely acknowledges 
that different types of uncertainty might need different analysis methods.  
Thought of different types of uncertainty having an effect on how uncertainty is managed 
is generally available in the literature; De Meyer et al. (2002) work also ends up with this 
conclusion. Other well-known example is the CYNEFIN framework developed at IBM 
(Kurtz & Snowden 2003), which aimed to help managers recognize the type of uncer-
tainty of the phenomenon to be managed, so they can adapt the management of the project 
accordingly. However, in both works the starting point is recognizing the type of the pro-
ject as a whole, not categorizing different elements of the project to different uncertainty 
categories.  
However, the idea of analyzing different types of uncertainty with different methods for 
forecasting and estimating purpose seems rare in previous literature. For example Project 
Management Body Of Knowledge only discusses about estimation (PMI 2008), and arti-
cles in the optimization school of project management are often mostly interested about 
developing one estimation method. Closest to this though are Garvey et al. (2016) with 
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their systems engineering perspective, acknowledging that uncertainty needs to be ana-
lyzed on the different levels of the system. This definition roughly corresponds to the 
thought presented here. 
8.4 Research weaknesses and mitigation efforts 
According to the Golafshani (2003), the three essential measures for research are validity, 
reliability and generalizability. In quantitative research, reliability can be defined as the 
consistency of the results, so that the similar research setting would produce similar re-
sults in the future. Validity refers to the ability of research to offer evidence for its results. 
Generalizability means ability to extend the findings from the specific research to wider 
population.  
However, in qualitative research, which this case study represents, this is not that straight-
forward. As Stenbacka (2001) notes, whereas in quantitative studies the purpose is often 
to explain, in qualitative studies it is to understand the situation. According to Stenbacka 
(2001), perfect reliability in qualitative study is irrelevant, as it is impossible to repeat 
qualitative study reproducing people and the setting. Similarly, it is impossible task to 
proof in qualitative context that study is valid; instead often the term validity in qualitative 
context refers to the rigorousness and trustworthiness of the research (Mishler 2000). This 
also means that many qualitative researchers give low priority altogether to generaliza-
bility (Schofield 2002); for example Denzin (1983) sees every qualitative study to carry 
its own “logic, sense of order, structure and meaning”. 
However, even if the terms validity, reliability and generalizability fit poorly to the qual-
itative research as such, this does not mean that the quality of the research could not be 
controlled and increased in qualitative studies. While it might not be able to generalize 
findings to the population as a whole, it can still be possible to generalize the findings 
from this thesis roughly to similar settings as in this study (Johnson 1997). Johnson (1997) 
proposes several common strategies to promote the validity and quality of qualitative re-
search. These are presented in Table 12.   
Table 12. Strategies to promote qualitative research quality (Johnson 1997). 
Strategy Description 
Extended fieldwork Researcher collects data over extensive period of 
time 
Theory triangulation Use of multiple theories for explanations 
Investigator triangulation Use of multiple researchers 
Method triangulation Use of multiple research methods 
Data triangulation Use of multiple data sources 
Participant feedback Discussion and feedback gathering with the par-
ticipants of the study 
Peer review Discussions of the conclusions with the other 
people, especially with another researcher 
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Negative case sampling Looking for cases that are not aligned with ex-
pectations and other results of the researcher 
Reflexivity Self-awareness and criticality about own biases 
 
Triangulation has been presented as one central way of ensuring good quality, trustworthy 
and rigorous qualitative study (Golafshani 2003). For example Golafshani (2003) encour-
ages its use in order to control bias and justify proposals, but also notes that it might not 
be sufficient or suitable for all the research settings. Nevertheless, if different settings and 
different people produce similar results, this increases the generalizability of the results 
(Johnson 1997). 
Noting that the generalizability, validity and reliability as concepts has been questioned 
altogether in qualitative research, some more detailed general weaknesses considering 
especially this study could be recognized: 
• Starting point of the research where the goal of the research is to improve case 
company’s processes 
• Researchers immersion in the daily activities of the case company and exposure 
on biases at the case company 
• Interventionist research approach and the possibility for idiosyncratic results (Su-
omala & Lyly-Yrjänäinen 2012) 
• Behavior of the interviewer might affect answers of the respondents (Saunders et 
al. 2011) 
• Nature of the qualitative research in general and its lack of objectivity  (Golafshani 
2003) 
• Difficulty of isolating the variables and the existence of other potential solutions 
(Hancock et al. 1998) 
Several of Johnson’s (1997) strategies to increase the quality of this research were utilized 
during the process. These are presented in Table 13: 
Table 13. Used mitigation strategies. 
Strategy How strategy was applied 
Extended fieldwork 
The research took place for six months in the case company's 
premises, communicating daily with the project management 
practioners 
Theory triangulation 
Multiple theories (Boundary object, Uncertainty, Project man-
agement) were used. However, each of these were used to 
solve a specific piece in the phenomena, and multiple theories 
were not used to proof the conclusions 
Participant feedback 
Feedback from the proposed solutions were constantly asked 
from participants. Study and its conclusions were supervised 
by the project management director at the case company. 
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Peer review 
Study and its conclusions was read by another student and su-
pervised by professor 
Method triangulation 
Usage of multiple methods (intervention, semi-structured inter-
views) 
 
Mitigation efforts to reduce these weaknesses are presented in Table 14: 
Table 14. Mitigation of the specific research weaknesses. 
Research weakness Mitigation efforts 
Starting point of the research where the 
goal of the research is to improve case 
company’s processes 
Topic of the research was not influenced by the 
case company 
 Researchers immersion in the daily 
activities of the case company and ex-
posure on biases at the case company 
Documentation of the discussions at the case 
company in a form of research diary. 
Interventionist research approach and 
the possibility for idiosyncratic results 
(Suomala, Lyly-Yrjänäinen 2012) 
External interviews; Peer review 
Behavior of the interviewer might affect 
answers of the respondents (Saunders et 
al. 2011) 
Interviewees knew about the topic of the inter-
view and the main points of interests, so they 
could prepare for topic 
Difficulty of isolating the variables and 
the existence of other potential solutions 
(Hancock, Ockleford & Windridge 1998) 
Interrupting several project managers and sales 
managers workflow with the intervention and 
evaluating the practicality and worth of the solu-
tion 
 
Case company provided the rough outline for the thesis topic; that is, the topic of project 
cost overruns. However, decisions after that to where to head the research was decided 
by the researcher. The theoretical frameworks of this thesis were also not interesting for 
the case company; rather from its viewpoint the results, better communication and quan-
tification of the risks, were the main outcomes of this thesis work.  
Fundamental weaknesses of the qualitative method could not be mitigated. While it can 
be stated that this thesis represents sufficient quality and trustworthiness for qualitative 
scientific research, it remains a possibility that other explanations can be offered. While 
the concept of boundary object at the light of this research seems like a powerful tool to 
manage and enable uncertainty estimation process, other frameworks or tools for though 
could have proved similarly good results.  
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
This research was exploratory, and its main purpose was to observe the changes that hap-
pen in the organization that implements uncertainty estimation practices. Main contribu-
tion of this research is to demonstrate in practice that the concept of boundary object is 
powerful tool in facilitating communication of uncertainty in the project cost estimation 
phase. Through this communication organizational topoi, perception on the project un-
certainty, can be formed by translating the views of different organizational functions into 
cost implications. Moreover, the tools used for the uncertainty analysis should be clearly 
linked to the different types of uncertainties in the project environment, and they should 
be understandable for the participants and the executioners of the cost estimation process 
to promote their usage and to enable them to be used meaningfully in the decision making.  
This thesis adopted a view of uncertainty as a construct. Considering that the project does 
not yet exist, and that uncertainty is by definition something, which current state is not 
known, this is only meaningful approach to the topic. Uncertainty transforms from the 
construction to reality as project progresses, and therefore the accuracy of the estimate 
can be researched after the project execution. Research of this learning process was omit-
ted here and could be a fruitful research venture because it is not trivial how to communi-
cate the estimation errors to the original estimation team and how their behavior changes 
as a result of this communication. 
This thesis did not build new knowledge about what psychological biases are in play in 
the project front-end management; instead, it presents concrete example on how different 
project stakeholders topoi can be brought together to justifiable analysis through the usage 
of boundary objects. Researching these biases and how they are communicated in broader 
perspective would be interesting for the further research. Difficulty in this kind of re-
search is to extract the variable: it is hard link specific bias into certain behavior. One 
concrete way to overcome this could be to compare the human estimations to estimations 
of different algorithms.   
This thesis was conducted from the viewpoint where company internally estimated the 
cost of a project for sales phase quotation. It would be interesting venture for further 
research to bring external stakeholders, such as subcontractors and customer, to the esti-
mation process. Knowledge boundary between the company and external stakeholders 
would be especially challenging to cross. However, recent developments for example in 
the alliance model projects (Van Marrewijk et al. 2008) also suggests that researching 
communicative tools for these types of ventures would be very interesting.  
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For managers, this thesis underlines the need to integrate different functions also for the 
estimation purposes and to understand that the estimations are social constructs, not ab-
solute and objective statements of the project reality. In this thesis the system to facilitate 
conversation was boundary object of contingency. In the situations where there is separate 
cost estimation function, the methods and analysis for the cost estimation can be more 
complicated and therefore all the functions do not necessarily need to understand process 
of the analysis. Nevertheless, the need to involve different viewpoints to the estimation 
practices remains. In these situations, boundary object could be something that is under-
standable for all of the stakeholders even if the analysis itself is outsourced for a separate 
function.  
From the uncertainty management perspective, this thesis also underlines the importance 
of connecting uncertainty and costs. Even though this is common practice in literature 
(PMI 2008), the external interviews and the case company revealed that this is not always 
done in practice. This is understandable from the viewpoint that assigning cost to risk is 
usually based on very subjective analysis, which was one of the issues that arose during 
the intervention. Therefore, the estimators might feel that it is wrong to put price on some-
thing that can not be measured and is not real. However, the fact remains that uncertainty 
during projects causes delays and cost overruns, so this thesis recommends putting price 
on uncertainty even when it can not be accurately estimated or calculated.  
From the practical perspective, this thesis offers a good model on how to estimate differ-
ent elements of uncertainty for tender purposes. It is important to be able to define the 
project in the terms of meaningful cost elements, which variation can then be analyzed. 
After this, the uncertainty that is not related to the cost items needs to be treated separately 
to prepare any cost implications those elements might have. Finally, these analyses re-
quire sufficient amount of time and the communication between stakeholders is especially 
crucial for the project success from the cost management perspective.  
Against project management literature this thesis provides a practical example that there 
is still a research gap between analytical methods and individuals and organizations prac-
tical understanding over these developed methods. More research and examples about the 
implementation of the methods and changes in organizational behavior and knowledge 
would be beneficial for the project management field. Moreover, during this research 
many biases and limitations of the humans to predict future were encountered. Under-
standing of the project environment is crucial, but at the same time increased knowledge 
and more sophisticated estimation methods would benefit project cost estimation. It 
would be beneficial to research practical implications of different estimation methods, 
algorithms and processes and how these can support human decision making.  
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APPENDIX 1. EXTERNAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS.  
Background information 
• Please introduce yourself and your position in the company shortly.  
o How your current role and previous role are linked to the project cost es-
timation? 
• What kind of projects your company executes? 
o What is the product? 
o What is the success criteria? 
o What are the most important stakeholders? 
Project uncertainty 
• What kind of uncertainties are typical for your projects? 
o What are the root causes of these uncertainties? 
• What are the causes of cost overruns? 
• How can the uncertainty be managed before the start of the project? 
Cost and uncertainty estimation process  
• How do you estimate uncertainty before the start of the project? 
o How is uncertainty estimated during the project execution? 
• How do you estimate project costs? 
o What is the official process for project cost estimation? 
o Who are involved in the process? 
o How does the customer, subcontractors and other stakeholders partici-
pate in the cost estimation process?  
Tools and methods for project cost estimation 
• What data you use for project cost estimation? 
• What tools do you use for cost estimation and uncertainty estimation? 
o Why do you use these tools? 
o What are the benefits of these tools? 
o What shortages and issues these tools have? 
Best practises and issues 
• What kind of practical problems there is in cost estimation? 
• What kind of new methods have you considered for project cost estimation? 
• What are the requirements for successful project cost estimation? 
• How do you think the uncertainty should affect price of the project? 
At the end 
• Do you still have something else in your mind, which is related to the project 
cost estimation or uncertainty? 
